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The thesis examines whether financial advisors play a role in the formation of merger and 
acquisition (M&A) waves at the industry level. The analysis demonstrates that financial 
advisors are the primary drivers of industry M&A waves. This finding suggests that financial 
advisors encourage companies to conduct M&A deals and thus contribute to the generation of 
industry M&A waves. The effects of financial advisors are consistent across different industry 
shocks that have been previously identified under the neoclassical theory. This thesis also finds 
that the interactions between financial advisors and different industry shocks are significantly 
and positively correlated with industry M&A waves, suggesting that financial advisors 
contribute to the effect of industry shocks in generating industry M&A waves. The results are 
robust to endogeneity controls and alternative explanations.   
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The phenomenon that merger and acquisition (M&A) activity clusters over time and 
across industries has been well documented in the M&A literature (Mitchell and Mulherin 1996, 
Mulherin and Boone 2000, Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford 2001, Harford 2005, Duchin and 
Schmidt 2013). For example, Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) find significant differences in the 
time-series clustering of M&A activities across 51 industries. Harford (2005) identifies 35 
industry M&A waves from 1981 to 2000 and Duchin and Schmidt (2013) observe 77 industry 
M&A waves from 1980 to 2009, with an average of 50 M&A deals in each wave. Many 
researchers have investigated various factors affecting the clustering of M&A activity. For 
instance, Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Rhodes‐Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) and Rhodes–
Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005) document that M&A waves are associated with 
overpriced bidder stock. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Harford (2005) find that industry 
M&A waves can be explained by industry shocks that shift the fundamental structure of 
industries. Harford (2005) documents the importance of capital liquidity in the generation of 
M&A waves. However, no prior study has examined the role of financial advisors in explaining 
industry M&A waves even though financial advisors are considered important financial 
intermediaries in the M&A market (Walter, Yawson and Yeung 2008, Ismail 2010, Golubov, 
Petmezas and Travlos 2012).  
This study investigates the role of financial advisors in industry M&A waves. In the 
literature, This study utilizes financial advisors to explain the formation of industry M&A 
waves after an industry shock has occurred. This study is important since it not only is the first 
to investigate the role of financial advisors in industry-level M&A activity but also supports 
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and expands the neoclassical theory with a new component to explain industry M&A waves. 
The neoclassical theory states that industry or economic shocks are the initial triggers for the 
formation of industry M&A waves. Industry and economic shocks have been considered as a 
highly consistent factor in explaining the formation of industry M&A waves (Mitchell and 
Mulherin 1996, Harford 2005, Powell and Yawson 2005, Garfinkel and Hankins 2011, Duchin 
and Schmidt 2013). However, there have been few studies that investigate the factors that drive 
the formation of industry M&A waves after industry shocks have occurred. Additionally, 
although financial advisors are identified as important financial intermediaries in the M&A 
market (Walter et al. 2008, Ismail 2010, Golubov et al. 2012), previous studies focus on the 
firm-level impact of financial advisors in the M&A market. This study fills these gaps by 
analysing financial advisors with a large sample of 56,632 M&A deals in 48 industries. This 
study contributes to the extant literature of the neoclassical theory since it is the first study that 
shows the importance of financial advisors in the generation of industry M&A waves after 
industry shocks have occurred. To uncover the role of financial advisors in industry M&A 
waves, two hypotheses are constructed.  
The first hypothesis is that the number of financial advisors has a positive association 
with industry M&A waves. It is posited that this occurs because financial advisor companies, 
in their pursuit of M&A advisory fees, have a strong motivation to generate industry M&A 
waves. Hunter and Jagtiani (2003) document that M&A advisory fees play an important role 
in motivating financial advisors to expedite the completion of M&A deals. Thus M&A 
advisory fees can be considered as a mechanism that financial advisors encourage corporate 
companies to be M&A clients and provide superior skills in M&A transactions. Because of 
M&A fees, financial advisors contribute to the generation of industry M&A waves by 
encouraging companies to conduct M&A activity, and by making M&A activity in which they 
are involved more successful due to their special skills in facilitating M&A transactions. The 
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more companies are persuaded by financial advisors to conduct M&A activity after an industry 
shock has occurred, the greater the possibility that an industry M&A wave would form. 
Financial advisors will obtain massive M&A advisory income from the encouragement. On the 
other hand, the superior skills and services contributed by financial advisors to M&A 
transactions can attract more companies to enter into M&A transactions that contribute to the 
generation of industry M&A waves. Bao and Edmans (2011) identify a significant investment 
bank fixed effect in the announcement returns of M&A deals. Walter et al. (2008) document 
that high-quality financial advisors have superior skills in completing M&A deals faster for 
corporate clients.  
Second, we hypothesise that financial advisors constitute an incremental factor that 
contributes to industry shocks in the generation of industry M&A waves. This is because 
financial advisors have an information advantage in the M&A market (Servaes and Zenner 
1996, Andrade et al. 2001). Financial advisors are in a better position to evaluate the impact of 
industry shocks and the appropriateness of a potential target or bidder. Thus, once an industry 
shock has taken place such as broad industry shock and deregulation, financial advisors use the 
opportunity to persuade more corporate clients to conduct M&As, hence financial advisors 
contribute to the industry shock in generating industry M&A waves.  
To examine these hypotheses, we construct an extensive M&A data sample from the 
Thomson Financial SDC database. The sample includes 56,632 M&A deals between 1980 and 
2017. The M&A transactions are classified into the Fama and French (1997) 48 industry groups. 
The final sample consists of 1824 industry-year observations. According to the definition of 
M&A wave (Brealey, Myers, Allen and Mohanty 1988, Mitchell and Mulherin 1996), we use 
the industry-year number of M&A transactions and M&A transaction volume to measure 
industry M&A waves, and we use the highest value of the number of M&A transactions or 
transaction value in the 2 consecutive years to capture the occurrence of industry M&A waves. 
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Analysis of the role of financial advisors in industry M&A waves is as follows. First, using 
OLS regression analysis, we examine the relationship between financial advisors and industry 
M&A waves after industry M&A shocks have occurred. The findings show that financial 
advisors are positively and significantly related to industry M&A waves after the occurrence 
of different types of industry shocks. This finding is consistent with our expectation and 
indicates that financial advisors contribute to the formation of industry M&A waves. As a 
robustness check, this study uses the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression to examine the 
relationship. The finding of an association between financial advisors and industry M&A 
waves remains robust after conducting the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions.  
Next, we conduct a series of tests to deal with potential endogeneity problems to establish 
the causal link between financial advisors and industry M&A waves. In this thesis, reverse 
causality is the main potential source of endogeneity. The positive association between 
financial advisors and industry M&A waves could be explained by reverse causality, as the 
industry waves initialized by industry shocks could attract financial advisors to participate in 
industry M&A activity. If this were the case, then financial advisors would be the consequence 
of the occurrence of industry M&A waves rather than a driver of industry M&A waves. To 
alleviate the potential endogeneity problem, this study employs a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
regression approach and a subgroup analysis using an exogenous shock.  
In the 2SLS regression approach, the first-stage regression models the financial advisors 
variable and the second-stage regression corrects for potential reverse causality. The 
instrumental variable (MarketFinAdvisor) in the first-stage regression represents the total 
number of financial advisor companies in the economy. The instrumental variable is correlated 
with the financial advisors variable because financial advisors participating in industry M&A 
waves are a part of the financial advisors in the economy, which satisfies the relevance criterion 
for an IV. Meanwhile, the instrumental variable is independent of industry M&A waves. This 
10 
 
is because not all financial advisors in the economy participate in industry M&A activity. 
Hence, the financial advisors in the economy cannot directly affect industry M&A waves. Also, 
the number of financial advisors in the economy (MarketFinAdvisor) is not decided by industry 
M&A waves, but the factors related to the whole economy, thus satisfying the exclusion 
criterion. The results generated from the 2SLS regression suggest that the association between 
financial advisors and industry M&A waves is robust. 
Subgroup analysis uses an exogenous shock, the Financial Services Modernization Act 
of 1999. This law change deregulated the M&A advisory market, allowing more companies to 
access the M&A advisory business. If financial advisors are a driver of industry M&A waves, 
this deregulation will increase the coefficient of financial advisors in predicting industry M&A 
waves from the year that deregulation occurred. Therefore, this exogenous shock provides a 
useful tool to examine the potential endogeneity problem. The results of the analysis of the 
exogenous shock are consistent with our expectation, which suggests that financial advisors 
are a driver of industry M&A waves.  
After the relationship between financial advisors and industry M&A waves is established, 
the next step is to explore the impact of the interactions between financial advisors and different 
types of industry shocks on industry M&A waves. This analysis aims to test the hypothesis that 
financial advisors are incremental to the effect of industry shocks in the generation of industry 
M&A waves after industry shocks have occurred. The evidence from this analysis shows that 
the interaction terms between financial advisors and industry shocks are positively correlated 
with industry M&A waves. This evidence is consistent with our expectation and suggests that 
financial advisors are an incremental factor to industry shocks to generate industry M&A waves.   
Lastly, this study employs two additional analyses to examine the relationship between 
financial advisors and industry M&A waves by employing an alternative measurement of 
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financial advisors and a dummy variable for measuring the occurrence of industry M&A waves. 
The purpose of these two additional analyses is to verify the robustness of the role of financial 
advisors in generating industry M&A waves. The alternative measurement of financial advisors 
is computed as the total number of the times that bidder and target financial advisors participate 
in industry M&A activity. The results show that financial advisors are still positively and 
significantly related to industry M&A waves. The dummy variable is based on the highest 
value of the number of M&A transactions or transaction value occurring in the 2 consecutive 
years. The dummy variable aims to capture the occurrence of industry M&A waves in their 
peak. By using the dummy measurement in the probit model, the analysis indicates that 
financial advisors are an important factor in generating industry M&A waves. These findings 
continue to support the first hypothesis. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on the role of financial advisors in 
industry M&A waves. Prior studies have found many different factors that determine M&A 
waves. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Harford (2005) document that fundamental industry 
or economic shocks that shift the structure of industries, lead to industry M&A waves. Shleifer 
and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes‐Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) provide evidence on how 
bidder overpriced stock affects M&A waves. Harford (2005) documents that industry M&A 
waves are caused by industry shocks only when there is sufficient capital market liquidity in 
the market. Garfinkel and Hankins (2011) propose a risk management hypothesis to explain 
the generation of industry M&A waves. Garfinkel and Hankins (2011) document a strong 
relationship between cash flow uncertainty and industry M&A waves, suggesting that M&As 
can be a solution to deal with cash flow uncertainty. No prior study has investigated the role of 
financial advisors in the generation of M&A waves. This study contributes to the literature by 
showing that financial advisors have a positive impact on industry M&A waves. The evidence 
suggests that financial advisors are an important determinant of industry M&A activity.  
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This study also provides empirical evidence about the importance of financial advisors 
in the M&A market at the industry level, given the evidence that financial advisors have a role 
in industry-level M&A activity in the literature. Prior literature finds that financial advisors are 
an important factor in affecting M&A transactions at the firm level (Walter et al. 2008, Bao 
and Edmans 2011, Golubov et al. 2012). This is an important issue since financial advisors are 
important financial intermediaries in the M&A market (Ismail 2010). It is necessary to have 
the theoretical knowledge not only about the firm-level impact of financial intermediaries but 
also about the industrial importance of financial intermediaries in the M&A market. The 
empirical evidence that financial advisors have a positive association with industry M&A 
waves demonstrates the importance of financial advisors in the M&A market at the industry 
level.  
Finally, the thesis contributes to the empirical evidence that supports the neoclassical 
theory. The neoclassical theory states that economic or industry shocks are the initial drivers 
of industry M&A waves (Mitchell and Mulherin 1996, Harford 2005, Powell and Yawson 
2005). However, after the initial effect of industry shocks on industry M&A waves, it is unclear 
what factors cause the intensive clustering of M&A activity. This study provides empirical 
evidence that financial advisors are an incremental factor to industry shocks in formulating 
industry M&A waves. Thus, this study contributes new information to the neoclassical theory 
in the explanation of the generation of industry M&A waves. Once an industry shock shifts the 
structure of an industry, an industry M&A wave starts and the formation of the industry M&A 
wave is further generated by financial advisors.  
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant 
literature. Chapter 3 describes the sample data and variable construction employed in this study. 
Chapter 4 investigates the relationship between financial advisors and industry M&A waves 
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and presents the results from additional analyses designed to alleviate the endogeneity problem. 





Prior Literature and the Development of the Hypotheses 
 
It is well known that M&A activity clusters over time (Mitchell and Mulherin 1996, 
Mulherin and Boone 2000, Jovanovic and Rousseau 2002, Brealey, Myers and Allen 2003). 
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Mulherin and Boone (2000) document that the clustering of 
M&A activity significantly varies across industries in the US. Furthermore, Powell and 
Yawson (2005) examine UK takeovers and divestitures in the 1980s and 1990s and find that 
UK takeovers cluster across industries and time, which is consistent with the finding of 
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996). Harford (2005) identifies 35 industry M&A waves using a 
simulation method on a sample from 1981 to 2000.  
Several theories have been proposed to explain why M&A activity clusters across 
industries and time (Mitchell and Mulherin 1996, Shleifer and Vishny 2003, Harford 2005, 
Powell and Yawson 2005, Garfinkel and Hankins 2011). Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Rhodes‐
Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) and Rhodes–Kropf et al. (2005) all suggest that M&A waves 
are correlated with stock market overvaluation. Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson and Teoh (2006) 
and Ang and Cheng (2006) employ accounting numbers to estimate the fundamental value of 
a company and get results consistent with Shleifer and Vishny (2003). Goel and Thakor (2009) 
argue that CEO envy is an important factor causing M&A waves. They document that the 
compensation for the CEOs of the bidder company is higher in earlier M&A transactions than 
in later M&A transactions. They suggest that the envy comes from the CEOs of the bidder 
companies who are jealous about the compensation of the CEOs in earlier M&A transactions; 
the envy motivates CEOs of bidder companies to undertake irrational M&A transactions. This 
causes clustering of M&A transactions. Ahern and Harford (2014) and Ahmad, Bodt and 
Harford (2017) suggest that the industry network of the relationships among companies, 
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consumers and suppliers is the channel that generates economy-wide M&A waves. However, 
the theory most consistently used to explain the clustering of M&A is the neoclassical theory.  
According to the neoclassical theory, M&A waves occur when economic or industrial 
shocks trigger reorganization of an industry (Gort 1969, Mitchell and Mulherin 1996, Powell 
and Yawson 2005, Garfinkel and Hankins 2011). The neoclassical theory assumes that the 
market is efficient and managers act in the best interests of shareholders (Mitchell and Mulherin 
1996). Once a shock hits an industry, the industry’s structure shifts and companies in the 
industry will reorganize their asset combination via M&As. This corporate restructuring aims 
to benefit the future development of the companies because M&As are considered as the most 
effective way to obtain the best asset combination. Coase (1937) is an early study supporting 
the view that technology shocks can result in active M&A activity. Mitchell and Mulherin 
(1996) examine the relationship between industry-level clustering of M&A activity and various 
industry shocks. They find that broad industry shocks or some specific industry shocks, such 
as deregulation and energy volatility, are positively correlated with industry M&A waves. They 
argue that industry shocks can change the business environment of an industry positively or 
negatively. Both positive and negative industry shocks can lead to industry M&A waves. 
Furthermore, Powell and Yawson (2005) show that UK takeovers are positively correlated with 
foreign competition shocks and industry returns. Additionally, Stahl (2016) provides evidence 
that corporate restructuring in the US broadcast industry became much more dynamic after the 
Telecommunication Act of 1996 was introduced. Calomiris (1999) also provides evidence to 
support the neoclassical theory. He documents that bank M&A waves throughout history have 
generated large efficiency gains for banks. Improved efficiency after industry shocks is one 
important implication under the neoclassical theory. Ovtchinnikov (2010) supports the 
neoclassical theory by showing that deregulation has a positive relationship with capital 
structure.    
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Another important determinant of M&A waves is capital liquidity. Harford (2005) 
documents that the spreads of the commercial and industrial (C&I) loan rate and the Fed funds 
rate are significantly negatively correlated with industry M&A waves. Harford (2005) argues 
the formation of industry M&A waves depends on the level of capital liquidity. Hence, when 
capital liquidity is sufficient, industry M&A waves can be initiated by different industry shocks. 
Khatami, Marchica and Mura (2015) and Almeida, Campello and Hackbarth (2011) support 
the importance of capital liquidity in facilitating M&A activity by showing that capital liquidity 
is positively related to acquisition decisions. Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) support the 
importance of capital liquidity by showing that variation of capital liquidity over time has 
strong effects on the level of total capital reallocation in the economy.  
Based on the neoclassical theory, Garfinkel and Hankins (2011) propose a risk 
management hypothesis to explain industry M&A waves. Examining mergers and tender offer 
transactions in the US market, Garfinkel and Hankins (2011) find that vertical integration 
transactions are required during industry M&A waves. They document a significant 
relationship between cash flow uncertainty and industry M&A waves. Garfinkel and Hankins 
(2011) argue that companies’ operating hedging purpose is related to industry M&A waves 
because industry shocks create periods of cash flow uncertainty within industries. Vertical 
integration is the solution for companies to deal with cash flow uncertainty. Garfinkel and 
Hankins (2011) conclude that risk management considerations are significant drivers of 
industry M&A waves.  
Even though past studies have identified several important factors that underpin M&A 
waves, the understanding of industry M&A waves is incomplete. Prior studies have not 
considered the role of financial advisors in creating industry M&A waves even though there is 
evidence that financial advisors play an important role in M&A activity (Servaes and Zenner 
1996, Walter et al. 2008, Bao and Edmans 2011, Golubov et al. 2012). For example, Hunter 
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and Walker (1990) state that financial advisors “can improve the overall quality of the matches 
made in the market relative to a market where firms by-pass merger intermediaries in favour 
of a do-it-yourself approach”. Hunter and Jagtiani (2003) and Walter et al. (2008) document 
that high-quality financial advisors can complete M&A deals faster. Furthermore, Hunter and 
Jagtiani (2003) find a positive correlation between the number of financial advisors employed 
and the probability of M&A transaction completion. Kale, Kini and Ryan (2003) document 
that the absolute gain by bidder companies is positively correlated with the reputation of bidder 
advisors, and they find that the total wealth generated in an M&A transaction is positively 
associated with the reputation of the bidder and target financial advisors. Bao and Edmans 
(2011), using a fixed-effects analysis, identify a significant investment bank fixed effect in the 
announcement of returns from M&A deals. Golubov et al. (2012) and Servaes and Zenner 
(1996) compare in-house acquisitions with M&A transactions with financial advisors. They 
find that the complexity of M&A transactions is positively correlated with the possibility of 
hiring financial advisors. Bowers and Miller (1990) show that top-class financial advisors have 
better expertise in delivering higher total synergies for M&A clients because of superior 
negotiation skills that financial advisors contribute through their advisory service. Hunter and 
Walker (1990) analyse M&A advisory fee structures. They conclude that M&A advisory fees 
motivate financial advisors to improve the efficiency of matches between buying and selling 
firms. Based on the literature regarding financial advisors, it is reasonable to believe that 
financial advisors play an important role in improving the quality of M&A transactions at the 
firm level. However, no prior study has examined the role of financial advisors in the 
generation of industry M&A waves. 
This study posits that financial advisors play a pivotal role in generating industry M&A 
waves by advising more companies to conduct M&As after an industry shock has occurred. 
This hypothesis is based on the neoclassical theory which states that industry shocks are the 
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initial cause of industry M&A waves (Gort 1969, Mitchell and Mulherin 1996, Harford 2005, 
Powell and Yawson 2005, Garfinkel and Hankins 2011). When an industry shock changes the 
structure of an industry, companies in that industry start to conduct M&As to restructure their 
asset combinations. The companies hire financial advisors to help them to execute the M&A 
transactions. Additionally, financial advisors have an information advantage in the M&A 
market (Servaes and Zenner 1996, Andrade et al. 2001) in the sense that they are better 
positioned to evaluate the impact of industry shocks and the appropriateness of a potential 
target or bidder. Thus, financial advisors consider industry shocks as an opportunity to 
encourage and persuade more companies to participate in M&A deals. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to expect that financial advisors can be an incremental factor contributing to 
industry shocks that trigger industry M&A waves.  
Financial advisors are willing to contribute to the generation of industry M&A waves 
because of the M&A advisory fees they expect to receive. An M&A advisory fee consists of 
fixed and contingent parts; the contingent part of advisory fees depends on completion of the 
transaction (McLaughlin 1990, McLaughlin 1992). Firmex and Divestopedia (2017) report that 
the fixed part of M&A advisory fees is paid in advance and is non-refundable. In the industry, 
the contingent advisory fee is also called the M&A success fee (Firmex and Divestopedia 2017). 
Based on the structure of M&A fees, if financial advisors do not finish M&A deals, they receive 
only the fixed part of the fee. On the other hand, if financial advisors complete M&A deals 
successfully, they will collect both the contingent reward and the fixed part of the fees from 
the M&A clients. Thus, regardless of M&A deals being completed or not, financial advisors 
have incentives to encourage more companies to become their clients. Therefore, once an 
industry shock hits the business environment of an industry, financial advisors are motivated 
to approach and persuade more companies in the industry to conduct M&A transactions. Thus, 
a greater the number of companies that financial advisors can persuade to participate in M&A 
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deals, the more likely an industry M&A wave is generated. At the same time, financial advisors 
can earn more aggregate M&A advisory revenue in the process. For example, Tully (2003) 
states that M&A bankers took advantage of an economic recovery trend that happened in 2003. 
Therefore, following an industry shock, it is expected that financial advisors encourage and 
persuade more companies to undertake M&A transactions.  
In addition, financial advisors contribute their special skills to M&A transactions and 
encourage companies to be involved in the M&A market after an industry shock has occurred. 
When M&A clients are satisfied with the contribution of financial advisors in M&A deals, they 
are more likely to hire financial advisors for the next M&A deal. Simultaneously, more new 
companies will be persuaded by financial advisors to participate in M&A deals. Thus, with the 
number of potential M&A clients increasing, financial advisors can receive more M&A 
advisory fees. This can explain the behaviour of financial advisors in generating industry M&A 
waves.  
The validity of the argument above rests on an important assumption: that each financial 
advisor has the capability to deal with infinite M&A transactions and clients at the same time. 
With this assumption, only a few financial advisors can generate an industry M&A wave. This 
assumption is not plausible. Within a short time period, the resources available to each financial 
advisor, such as human resources, are limited and fixed. In other words, an individual financial 
advisor can handle only a limited number of M&A transactions at one time. However, only if 
more financial advisors engage in the M&A market after a shock has occurred, this problem is 
overcome and all potential M&A clients can be serviced. Thus, an industry M&A wave can be 
generated by financial advisors following an industry shock if new financial advisors enter the 
market in a particular industry.   
Based on the reasons discussed above, the following hypotheses are proposed:  
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H1: The number of financial advisors is positively associated with industry M&A waves.  
H2: Financial advisors are incremental to the effects of industry shocks in the formation 





Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 M&A activity and industry M&A waves 
 
The sample of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) is constructed from the Thomson 
Financial SDC database from 1 January 1970 to 31 December 2017. The sampling criteria 
follow Golubov et al. (2012) and Harford (2005). An M&A deal is included in the sample only 
if it meets all of the following conditions. First, each merger or acquisition bid has a transaction 
value of at least 50 million in US dollar. Secondly, the M&A bids must involve both US bidders 
and targets. Thirdly, each merger or acquisition transaction must be announced or have been 
completed. These sample criteria resulted in an initial sample of 56,632 M&A deals. The M&A 
transactions are classified into the Fama and French (1997) 48 industry groups. The final 
sample consists of 1824 industry-years.   
To assess industry M&A waves, three measurements are employed. The first two 
measurements are employed by Brealey et al. (2003) and Powell and Yawson (2005). The two 
measurements are: (i) the number of completed M&A transactions (Numdeals); and (ii) the 
industry-level transaction value of the completed M&A transactions (Deal value). The 
measurement of industry M&A waves in this study differs from the approach of Mitchell and 
Mulherin (1996) and Mulherin and Boone (2000). They measure industry M&A waves by the 
number of transactions over the sample period as the percentage of the number of total 
companies. However, the measurement in this study and the measurement of Mitchell and 
Mulherin (1996) and Mulherin and Boone (2000) have the same rationale. This is because 
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Mulherin and Boone (2000) hold the number of total 
companies constant over time. Hence, in principle, they used the number of M&A transactions 
over time to measure industry M&A waves.  
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Apart from the two measurements above, another indicator is employed to measure 
industry M&A waves. The third measurement, NumTdeals, is the number of M&A 
announcements during the calendar year. In the literature, industry M&A waves have been 
identified by completed M&A deals in different forms (Mitchell and Mulherin 1996, Mulherin 
and Boone 2000, Harford 2005). For example, Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Mulherin and 
Boone (2000) measure industry M&A waves by the number of completed M&A transactions 
over the sample period as the percentage of the constant number of total companies. However, 
before each M&A deal is completed, it must be announced. Once an industry shock hits an 
industry environment, companies in the affected industry start to conduct M&A activities so 
that a great number of M&A announcements must be witnessed before clustering of completed 
M&A transactions occurs. Therefore, it is reasonable to use the number of M&A 
announcements across industries and time to capture the generation of industry M&A waves.  
[Insert Table 1 approximately here] 
In order to investigate the position that the number of M&A announcements across 
industries and time can be used to capture the generation of industry M&A waves, we analyse 
the lengths between M&A announcement and M&A deal completion. Table 1 presents the time 
lengths for 48 industries. The time length between M&A announcement and M&A deal 
completion is measured by days. As shown in Table 1, all 48 industries have average time 
lengths below 182.5 days (half of a year). The maximum average time length across 48 
industries is 156.58 days, which occurs in the banking industry. Moreover, the highest median 
time length across the 48 industries is 151, which also occurs in the banking industry. This 
number is also less than 182.5. Thus, for the M&A bids that are completed, on average, M&A 
announcements can be completed within one year. Therefore, it is reasonable to use the number 




3.2 Measuring financial advisors  
 
The financial advisors data are also sourced from the Thomson Financial SDC database, 
along with the M&A transactions data. Like the M&A transaction data, financial advisors data 
are allocated into the 48 industry groups based on Fama and French (1997) industry 
classification and are summarized on a yearly basis. Each observation represents one industry-
year.  
To capture the role of financial advisors in industry M&A waves, this study uses two 
measurements. The first measurement, UniqueFinAdvisor, is constructed as the sum of both 
bidders and targets’ financial advisors without duplicate company names. This variable 
captures the number of unique financial advisors at the industry level because unique financial 
advisors only consist of different financial advisor companies. The second measurement, 
NumFinAdvisor, is the total number of times that financial advisors participate in industry 
M&A activity each year. The only difference between these two variables is the sum of 
duplicate M&A transactions that each individual financial advisor handles. For example, in 
one industry, five M&A deals involving different companies are completed by JP Morgan in a 
year. The first measurement is one and the second variable is five. Therefore, the first variable 
is expected to capture the role of unique financial advisor companies in industry M&A waves. 
The second variable captures not only the role of unique financial advisors in industry M&A 
waves but also the multiple M&A bids that each financial advisor handles. Therefore, the 
second variable is expected to capture all participation of financial advisors in the M&A market.  
 
3.3 Measuring industry shocks 
 
Broadly, industry shocks are categorized into two groups: broad industry shocks and 
specific industry shocks (Mitchell and Mulherin 1996, Powell and Yawson 2005). Mitchell and 
Mulherin (1996) and Powell and Yawson (2005) argue that broad industry shocks aim to 
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directly measure the economic change experienced by industries that can alter industry 
structure. Broad industry shocks are measured by three aspects: sales, employment and 
operating cash flow (Mitchell and Mulherin 1996, Powell and Yawson 2005). Each type of 
shock, including sales, cash flow and employment shocks, is measured in two ways: abnormal 
sales (cash flow, employment) growth and sales (cash flow, employment) shock. Following 
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Powell and Yawson (2005), this study uses these three types 
of broad industry shock and calculates the abnormal sales growth as the growth for the 5-year 
period preceding the sample year. Sales shocks are defined as the absolute value of the 
difference between an industry’s abnormal sales growth and the average sales growth across 
all 48 industries. This process is repeated for the cash flow and employment shocks. Taking 
the absolute value in shock variables captures the broad industry shocks in both positive and 
negative ways because industry shocks can positively or negatively change the structure of 
industries (Mitchell and Mulherin 1996, Powell and Yawson 2005). Therefore, the absolute 
value of a shock variable takes both positive and negative impacts of industry shocks into 
consideration.  
Prior studies show that two types of specific industry shocks, deregulation and 
technology change, significantly contribute to industry M&A waves (Mitchell and Mulherin 
1996, Harford 2005, Powell and Yawson 2005). Deregulation increases the pressure of the 
market and competition within affected industries (Mitchell and Mulherin 1996, Powell and 
Yawson 2005). The changes in the industry’s business environment require companies in the 
affected industry to adapt, which can be facilitated by M&A transactions. Mitchell and 
Mulherin (1996) argue that technology shock is negatively associated with industry M&A 
waves because the substitution mechanism takes place between R&D expenditure and asset 
restructuring. If companies have high R&D expenditure, they are unlikely to merge or acquire 
other firms because of limited financial resources.  
25 
 
This study further explores these two types of specific industry shocks. For the 
deregulation variable, Harford (2005) and Ovtchinnikov (2013) employ deregulation events 
which are provided by Viscusi, Harrington and Vernon (2005) to generate a deregulation 
dummy variable. The deregulation events included in this study are also obtained from Viscusi 
et al. (2005), with updates of deregulation events until 2017 from the US annual Economic 
Report of the President. This report provides an annual overview of US economic progress and 
publishes deregulation initiatives annually. The report is the source of the deregulation events 
in Viscusi et al. (2005). For the deregulation variable, following Powell and Yawson (2005) 
and Garfinkel and Hankins (2011), the deregulation-event dummy equals one for all post-
deregulation years within the deregulated industry. The other type of specific industry shock is 
technology change. To assess technology change, this study uses the proxy from Mitchell and 
Mulherin (1996), the industry-level R&D/sales ratio. Except for deregulation, shock 
measurements are based on financial information at the industry level. Deregulation is 
measured as a dummy variable equal to one for all post-deregulation years. The financial 
information is retrieved from the Compustat database. All industry shock indicators are 
measured at the year t-1 in the analysis, except for deregulation, which is measured at year t.  
 
3.4 Other control variables 
 
It is necessary to control for previously documented factors that can affect industry M&A 
waves. Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Rhodes‐Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) and Rhodes–Kropf 
et al. (2005) document that the bull stock market condition is related to M&A waves. Including 
variables that are related to stock market conditions allows measurement of the role of financial 
advisors in industry M&A waves without the impact of the bull stock market condition. 
Following Harford (2005), the following control variables are used to exclude the possibility 
that stock market conditions affect the results: market-to-book ratio (MB), 3-year return 
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(Return), and the standard deviation (SD) of 3-year return and industry capitalization 
(Induscap). MB is the industry median market-to-book ratio. Return is the industry-level 3-year 
return. SD is the intra-industry standard deviation of 3-year return and Induscap is computed 
as the natural log of the value of industry capitalization.  
Harford, Klasa and Walcott (2009) document that leverage level is related to M&A 
transactions since companies are willing to reach optimal leverage level via M&As. Harford 
(2005) and Garfinkel and Hankins (2011) provide evidence supporting the importance of 
leverage in M&A waves. So it is necessary to control for the leverage ratio at the industry level 
in this analysis to eliminate the impact of leverage. Following Harford (2005) and Garfinkel 
and Hankins (2011), the industry median debt-to-equity ratio (DE) is included in the model. 
The financial information for the control variables such as industrial-level market-to-book ratio 
and debt-to-equity ratio is from the Compustat database, and the data for calculating the 
variables related to stock price, such as return and industry capitalization, are from the CRSP 
database.  
3.5 Econometric model 
 
The empirical analysis aims to investigate whether financial advisors contribute to 
industry M&A waves following industry shocks. An econometric model is employed and 
examined by ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions using industry-year panel data, as 
specified in the following equation:  
            𝑀&𝐴 𝑤𝑎𝑣ⅇ𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐹𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡       (1) 
 
The dependent variable, M&A wavesi,t, measures industry M&A waves for industry i year 
t. The following variables as the dependent variables are used in the regressions in turn: (1) the 
number of completed M&A transactions (Numdeals); (2) the number of announced M&A 
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transactions (NumTdeals); and (3) M&A transaction value (Deal value). The key independent 
variable, FAi,t, represents the number of financial advisors engaged in industry i at year t. The 
variable, FAi,t, consists of two measurements: (1) the number of unique financial advisors 
(UniqueFinAdvisor); and (2) the number of times that financial advisors participate in industry 
M&A activity (NumFinAdvisor). Another independent variable, Shocki,t-1, captures industry 
shocks for industry i at year t-1. Industry shocks include broad industry shocks and specific 
industry shocks. The industry shock variables are motivated by Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) 
and Powell and Yawson (2005), who examine the role of sales shocks, cash flow shocks, 
employment shocks, deregulation and technology change in industry M&A waves. Since the 
focus of this study is whether financial advisors contribute to industry M&A waves following 
industry shocks, this study estimates financial advisors one year after industry shocks. The 
control variables include market-to-book ratio (MB), 3-year return (Return), standard deviation 
of 3-year return (SD), debt-to-equity ratio (DE) and industry capitalization (Induscap).  
3.6 Summary Statistics 
 
 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the sample of 1824 industry-year observations 
which include Fama and French (1997) 48 industries and 38 years from 1970 to 2017. The 
sample size differs across variables because of missing data. The mean for a variable is the 
average number across all sample years and industries. As reported in Table 2, the mean in 
completed M&A deals (Numdeals) is 28.53, which represents the average number of completed 
M&A deals per year, per industry. The average number of M&A announcements (NumTdeals) 
per year, per industry is 31.05. The difference indicates that, on average, around 2.5 M&A 
announcements fail to be successfully completed per year, per industry. The average annual 
transaction value of completed M&A deals across the 48 industries is $US18.47 billion.  
[Insert Table 2 approximately here] 
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In relation to the financial advisor measurements, the deviation of mean values between 
unique financial advisors (UniqueFinAdvisor) and the participation times of financial advisors 
(NumFinAdvisor) is interesting. The mean of unique financial advisors (UniqueFinAdvisor) is 
16.52 whereas the participation times of financial advisors (NumFinAdvisor) has a mean of 
33.94. The NumFinAdvisor average is just over twice as many as UniqueFinAdvisor. This 
indicates financial advisors are very active in the M&A market, and they are willing to handle 
multiple M&A transactions within a year. This is consistent with the argument that financial 
advisors are willing to encourage more companies to do M&A transactions.  
The maximum values of all variables are presented in Table 2 column 6. The maximum 
values of Numdeals, NumTdeals, Deal value, UniqueFinAdvisor, NumFinAdvisor do not occur 
in the same industry or the same year. As reported in Table 2, the maximum number of 
completed M&A deals (Numdeals) is 575, which occurred in the finance industry in 2017. For 
that year, the finance industry had 149 unique financial advisors (UniqueFinAdvisor) and 
financial advisors participated 241 times in M&A deals (NumFinAdvisor). The maximum 
number of M&A announcements (NumTdeals) is 620 and the maximum completed M&A 
transaction value (Deal value) is $US691.74 billion. Both maximum numbers occurred in the 
finance industry for 2006. The maximum number of unique financial advisors 
(UniqueFinAdvisor) is 150, which occurred in 2006. This means that there were 150 different 
financial advisor companies helping M&A clients in the finance industry in 2006. The 
maximum value of total participation of financial advisors (NumFinAdvisor) is 556, which was 
in the business service industry for 2000. In the same year, that industry had 461 completed 
M&A transactions (Numdeals) and 473 M&A announcements (NumTdeals).  
Table 3 reports the correlations between Numdeals, NumTdeals, Deal value, 
UniqueFinAdvisor, NumFinAdvisor and the other control variables. As reported in Table 3, the 
correlations among the number of completed M&A deals (Numdeals) and the number of M&A 
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announcements (NumTdeals) and the completed M&A transaction value (Deal value) derived 
from the same scale are positive and over 0.8. This is because, when an industry M&A wave 
occurs, the M&A market is active and the number of completed M&A transactions is much 
greater than during a normal period. At the same time, M&A announcements and transaction 
value also experience a boom condition. So in the periods of industry M&A waves, a greater 
number of completed M&A deals and announced M&A deals, as well as transaction value, are 
observed together. Additionally, the correlation between financial advisors and industry M&A 
waves is over 0.8 (see Table 3). This implies that the relationship between financial advisors 
and industry M&A waves is positive and nearly linear. However, the industry capitalization 
has positive correlations with the measurements of financial advisors. For example, industry 
capitalization (Induscap) and unique financial advisors (UniqueFinAdvisor) have a correlation 
coefficient of 0.563. This may lead to a multicollinearity problem in the OLS regression model. 
A multicollinearity problem may lead to incorrect results for financial advisors in the 
regression. To deal with this potential issue, additional tests removing industry capitalization 
in the model were conducted1.  
 [Insert Table 3 approximately here] 
  
                                                     
1 When the Induscap variable was removed from the regression analysis, the relationship between financial 






4.1 Financial advisors and broad industry shocks  
 
Table 4 provides empirical evidence that financial advisors significantly affect industry 
M&A waves after broad industry shocks have occurred. Specifically, when sales shocks are 
examined in the regression, as reported in columns 1-3, the coefficients for unique financial 
advisors (UniqueFinAdvisor) are positive and economically significant at the 1% level in 
predicting industry M&A waves. For example, all else being equal, a one-standard-deviation 
(17.82574) increase in unique financial advisors (UniqueFinAdvisor) leads to an average 
increase of 53 deals (2.984*17.82574) in the number of completed M&A transactions 
(Numdeals) and an average increase of $US37.38 billion (2.097*17.82574) in the completed 
M&A transaction value (Deal value). When the cash flow and employment shocks are 
measured, as shown in columns 4-6 and columns 7-9, respectively, the coefficients for financial 
advisors are similar to the results for sales shock in both size and significance. For example, as 
shown in columns 1 and 4, the coefficients for financial advisors controlled for sales shock and 
cash flow shock are 2.984 and 3.072, respectively, significant at the 1% level. The evidence 
reported in Table 4 supports the first hypothesis that the number of financial advisors is 
positively associated with industry M&A waves and shows that financial advisors are an 
important factor affecting industry M&A waves following broad industry shocks.  
[Insert Table 4 approximately here] 
For the broad industry shock variables in the regression, as reported in Table 4, the 
coefficient of industry shocks is positive and significant in predicting industry M&A waves, 
which is consistent with the neoclassical theory, such as Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Harford 
(2005) and Powell and Yawson (2005). However, the control variables such as market-to-book 
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ratio (MB), 3-year return (Return) and the standard deviation of 3-year return (SD) have no 
significant impact in predicting industry M&A waves, and even industry capitalization 
(Induscap) has a negative association with industry M&A waves. This is not consistent with 
evidence related to bull stock market condition (Shleifer and Vishny 2003, Rhodes‐Kropf and 
Viswanathan 2004). 
To confirm the positive association between financial advisors and industry M&A waves 
following broad industry shocks, two additional analyses are conducted. First, the Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) regressions are estimated in lieu of the OLS regressions. Compared with OLS 
regressions, the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions correct standard errors for the 
correlation among 48 industries. The result of the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions are 
presented in Appendix Table 2. As the results of the OLS regressions, the coefficient of unique 
financial advisors (UniqueFinAdvisor) (see Appendix Table 2) remains positive and significant 
at the 1% level in predicting industry M&A waves after controlling for the three types of broad 
industry shocks (sales shock, cash flow shock, employment shock). For example, as shown in 
Appendix Table 2, column 1, all else being equal, a one-standard-deviation increase in unique 
financial advisors (UniqueFinAdvisor) is associated with an average increase of 46 
(2.575*17.82574) deals in completed M&A transactions (Numdeals), which is significant at 
the 1% level. This empirical finding in Appendix Table 2 reinforces the first hypothesis and 
the importance of financial advisors in affecting industry M&A waves. In addition, as shown 
in Appendix Table 2, the coefficients of sales shock, cash flow shock and employment shock 
are positive and significant in predicting industry M&A waves, which is consistent with the 
neoclassical theory (Mitchell and Mulherin 1996, Powell and Yawson 2005).  
𝑀&𝐴 𝑤𝑎𝑣ⅇ𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + ln (𝑀&𝐴 𝑤𝑎𝑣ⅇ𝑠𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐹𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡       (2) 
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Secondly, the dependent variables are transformed into a new form to examine the role 
of financial advisors in the generation of industry M&A waves in order to confirm the 
robustness of the positive association between financial advisors and industry M&A waves. 
The new measurement of completed M&A deals is computed as the natural log of Numdeals 
plus Numdeals. This process is repeated for M&A announcements (Numdeals) and transaction 
value of completed M&A transaction (Deal value). There are two reasons for employing this 
form of dependent variables, rather than the direct natural logarithm. The first is that some 
industries have no M&A transactions in some years, e.g., the defence industry had no M&A 
bids in 1982 and 1983. The second reason is that the correlations between financial advisors 
indicators and the indicators of industry M&A waves are all higher than 0.8 as is shown in 
Table 3. This means that financial advisors and industry M&A waves have a linear, positive 
relationship, rather than a logarithmic relationship. Appendix Table 3 shows that the coefficient 
of unique financial advisors (UniqueFinAdvisor) is positive and significant in predicting 
industry M&A waves following sales, cash flow and employment shocks. The results for 
financial advisors in Appendix Table 3 further support the significant effect of financial 
advisors on industry M&A waves. The evidence of broad industry shocks is consistent with 
the neoclassical theory (Mitchell and Mulherin 1996, Powell and Yawson 2005).  
4.2 Financial advisors and specific industry shocks  
 
Following Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Harford (2005), this study uses 
deregulation and technology shocks to explore the relationship between financial advisors and 
industry M&A waves. Deregulation plays a role to increase the pressure of the market and 
competition within the affected industries (Mitchell and Mulherin 1996, Powell and Yawson 
2005). The changes in the industry business environment require companies in the affected 
industry to adapt, which can be facilitated by M&A transactions. Thus, a deregulation shock 
can lead to M&A activity clustering. Harford (2005) and Ovtchinnikov (2013) use the 
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deregulation events proposed by Viscusi et al. (2005) to generate a deregulation dummy 
variable. In this study, the deregulation events and the affected industries are listed in Table 5. 
Table 5 includes the deregulation events in Viscusi et al. (2005) and updates them to 2017 from 
the US Annual Economic Report of the President. This report is the source of the deregulation 
events listed by Viscusi et al. (2005). There are a total of 10 affected industries: agriculture, 
banking, pharmaceutical products, entertainment, healthcare, insurance, petroleum and natural 
gas, telecommunication, transportation and utility.  
[Insert Table 5 approximately here] 
For technology shocks, Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) show that industry R&D/sales ratio 
is negatively associated with industry M&A waves. They argue that a project substitution 
mechanism takes place between R&D expenditure and asset restructuring. If companies have 
high R&D expenditure, they are unlikely to merge or acquire other firms because of limited 
financial resources.  
Table 6 shows that financial advisors are a determinant of industry M&A waves 
following specific industry shocks. Specifically, when deregulation is included in the analysis, 
as presented in Table 6, columns 1-3, the coefficients of unique financial advisors 
(UniqueFinAdvisor) are positive and economically significant at the 1% level, related to 
industry M&A waves. For instance, all else being equal, a one-standard-deviation increase in 
unique financial advisors (UniqueFinAdvisor) predicts an average increase of 35 
(1.95*17.82574) deals in completed M&A transactions (Numdeals) and an average increase of 
$US37.26 (2.09*17.82574) billion in completed M&A transaction value (Deal value). When 
technology shock is included in the regression, financial advisors retain a positive and 
significant relationship with industry M&A waves. For instance, all else being equal, as shown 
in Table 6, column 4, a one-standard-deviation increase in unique financial advisors 
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(UniqueFinAdvisor) predicts an average increase of 53 (2.998*17.82574) deals in completed 
M&A transactions (Numdeals). Therefore, the empirical evidence in Table 6 supports the first 
hypothesis and demonstrates the importance of financial advisors in industry M&A waves after 
specific industry shocks have occurred. The effect of deregulation on industry M&A waves is 
consistent with the findings of Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Harford (2005) and Powell and 
Yawson (2005), and the effect of technology shocks on industry M&A waves are similar to the 
evidence of Mitchell and Mulherin (1996).  
[Insert Table 6 approximately here] 
Like the consistency test of financial advisors reported in Appendix Tables 2 and 3, the 
role of financial advisors in industry M&A waves following specific industry shocks is 
examined using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression method and transformation of the 
dependent variables. Appendix Table 4 shows the results of the Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
regressions; unique financial advisors (UniqueFinAdvisor) remain an important factor in 
predicting industry M&A waves at the 1% significance level. For specific industry shocks, the 
results show that technology change is negatively correlated with industry M&A waves, 
consistent with prior research (Mitchell and Mulherin 1996). The coefficients of deregulation 
in the Fama-Macbeth regressions are positive but insignificant.  
Appendix Table 5 shows the regression results after the dependent variables are 
transformed. Compared with Table 6 and Appendix Table 4, Appendix Table 5 shows that 
unique financial advisors (UniqueFinAdvisor) are positively and significantly correlated with 
industry M&A waves. The coefficients of financial advisors (UniqueFinAdvisor) in Appendix 
Table 5 still support the first hypothesis that financial advisors are positively associated with 
industry M&A waves following specific industry shocks. Additionally, specific industry 
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shocks have a significant impact on industry M&A waves, consistent with Mitchell and 
Mulherin (1996), Harford (2005) and Powell and Yawson (2005).  
4.3 Endogeneity concerns  
           
Though the analyses above establish a link between financial advisors and industry M&A 
waves, the model may suffer from potential endogeneity problems. Reverse causality is the 
most important potential endogeneity concern. In the relationship between financial advisors 
and industry M&A waves, reverse causality may exist because the relationship could be subject 
to an alternative explanation. Industry M&A waves could attract more financial advisors to 
deal with M&A transactions after industry shocks have initialized the industry M&A waves. 
In that case, financial advisors become a consequence of the generation of industry M&A 
waves, rather than a driver of industry M&A waves. This contradicts the two hypotheses and 
the arguments. This section tries to alleviate the reverse causality problem with a two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) regression approach and a subgroup analysis using an exogenous shock.  
4.3.1 The 2SLS regression approach 
 
The 2SLS regression approach is used to deal with the reverse causality problem. The 
2SLS equations are listed below: 
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑞𝑢ⅇ𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘ⅇ𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡 + 𝛼2 ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼3 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑖,𝑡       (3) 
𝑀&𝐴 𝑤𝑎𝑣ⅇ𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑞𝑢ⅇ𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡̂ + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                   (4) 
Equation (2) is the first-stage regression, which models the financial advisors variable. 
Equation (3) is the second-stage regression which corrects for the reverse causality problem. 
The instrumental variable, MarketFinAdvisor, should have an impact on the financial advisors 
participating in the industry M&A activity (UniqueFinAdvisor), but not on the industry M&A 
waves. To construct MarketFinAdvisor, all financial advisor companies from the 48 industries 
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are summarized and duplicate companies eliminated. MarketFinAdvisor is the number of this 
group of financial advisors on a yearly basis. This group of financial advisors is considered as 
the total unique financial advisors in the whole economy. MarketFinAdvisor is correlated with 
the unique financial advisors (UniqueFinAdvisor) because the unique financial advisors 
participating in industry M&A activity (UniqueFinAdvisor) are a part of the unique financial 
advisors in the economy. Furthermore, MarketFinAdvisor is independent of industry M&A 
waves. This is because not all unique financial advisors in the economy participate in industry 
M&A activity. Hence, MarketFinAdvisor is not a cause of industry M&A waves. Meanwhile, 
the number of unique financial advisors in the economy (MarketFinAdvisor) is not decided by 
industry M&A waves, but the factors related to the whole economy. As shown in Table 3, the 
correlation between MarketFinAdvisor and industry M&A waves is less than 0.2. Therefore, 
the unique financial advisors in the economy (MarketFinAdvisor) can be considered as a valid 
instrumental variable.  
Table 7 reports the 2SLS regression results. Table 7, column 1, shows the first-stage 
equation with sales shocks. The instrumental variable, MarketFinAdvisor, is positively 
correlated with unique financial advisors, significant at the 1% level. The instrumented variable 
in the second stage is the predicted value of unique financial advisors from the first stage. In 
columns 2, 3, and 4, the second-stage equations are provided when controlled for sales shocks. 
The coefficients of predicted unique financial advisors are 2.552 in predicting completed M&A 
transactions (Numdeals), 2.326 in predicting M&A announcements (NumTdeals), and 2.154 in 
predicting transaction value (Deal value). All coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Columns 5-8 are the results of the 2SLS regressions controlling for cash flow shocks. 
Column 5 suggests that MarketFinAdvisor is a statistically significant factor for unique 
financial advisors, with a coefficient of 0.05 at the 1% significance level. The second-stage 
equations reported in columns 6-8 show the predicted unique financial advisors are 
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significantly, positively correlated with industry M&A waves after employment shocks have 
occurred. When examining employment shocks, the results in columns 9-12 show that the 
MarketFinAdvisor in the first stage is still a significant factor and the instrumented variable is 
positively correlated with all industry M&A wave measurements at the 1% significance level.  
[Insert Table 7 approximately here] 
Table 8 presents the 2SLS regressions when controlling for specific industry shocks. 
Table 8, columns 1-4, show the first- and second-stage equations with deregulation shock 
control. Columns 5-8 show the first- and second-stage equations for technology shocks. For 
the first-stage equations in columns 1 and 5, the coefficients of MarketFinAdvisor are positive 
and statistically significant in predicting the unique financial advisors (UniqueFinAdvisor). In 
the second-stage equations, the predicted unique financial advisors are significantly and 
positively associated with industry M&A waves when measuring the responses to either 
deregulation or technology shocks.  
[Insert Table 8 approximately here] 
Based on the 2SLS regression results, the empirical results show that the positive 
association between financial advisors and industry M&A waves is robust. The results support 
the conclusion that financial advisors are a significant determinant of industry M&A waves 
rather than the consequences of industry M&A waves.  
4.3.2 Subgroup analysis 
 
Secondly, subgroup analysis with an exogenous shock is used to test the relationship 
between financial advisors and industry M&As. The exogenous shock is the introduction of 
the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999. This law change deregulated the finance 
industry. The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 allowed different types of 
financial companies, such as commercial banks, insurance companies and investment banks, 
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to integrate their operations. Before 1999, insurance companies and commercial banks were 
prohibited from providing financial advisory services for M&A activity. After 1999, more 
financial companies were allowed to access the M&A market as financial advisors. Because of 
the timing of the law change, the sample period (1980-2017) is divided into two subgroups: the 
pre- and the post-change groups. The pre-change group consists of observations before 1999. 
The post-change group includes the observations from 1999. If financial advisors are a driver 
of the generation of industry M&A waves then, when more financial advisors enter the market 
as a result of the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, it is reasonable to expect that 
more completed M&A transactions, more M&A announcements, and higher transaction value 
would result. On the other hand, if the financial advisors participating in the M&A market are 
a consequence of the occurrence of industry M&A waves, the law change affecting financial 
advisors would have no impact on the magnitude of the coefficient of unique financial advisors. 
This is because industry M&A waves are drivers of the participation of financial advisors in 
the M&A market rather than financial advisors causing M&As to cluster.  
The results from the exogenous shock analysis controlling for broad industry shocks are 
reported in Table 9. The pre-change group results are presented in columns 1, 3 and 5, and the 
post-change group results are in columns 2, 4 and 6. The differences in financial advisor 
coefficients between the pre- and post-change groups are tested using the Wald test. As 
presented in Table 9, an increase in the coefficient of unique financial advisors 
(UniqueFinAdvisor) from pre-change to post-change is seen and is statistically significant, by 
the Wald test. For example, in columns 1 and 2, Panel A, the coefficient of unique financial 
advisors (UniqueFinAdvisor) increases from 2.391 to 3.187 in predicting completed M&A 
transactions (Numdeals). The p-value of the difference of the coefficients of UniqueFinAdvisor 
is 0.0019, from the Wald test. Furthermore, as shown in Table 9, based on the Wald test, the 
increase in the coefficient of unique financial advisors (UniqueFinAdvisor) from pre-change to 
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post-change is significant and consistent when controlled for different types of broad industry 
shocks. These empirical results support the expectation that the exogenous shock causes a 
significant and positive effect on the independent variable, which provides evidence to show 
that financial advisors are a determinant of industry M&A waves rather than a consequence of 
industry M&A waves when broad industry shocks are controlled in the model.  
[Insert Table 9 approximately here] 
The pre- and post-change results to specific industry shocks are reported in Appendix 
Table 6; columns 1, 3 and 5 are the pre-change results, and columns 2, 4 and 6 are post-change 
results since 1999. When either deregulation or technology change shocks are included in the 
regression, the post-change coefficients of unique financial advisors on industry M&A waves 
are greater than the coefficients of unique financial advisors in the pre-change period. By the 
Wald Test, the differences in the coefficients of unique financial advisors (UniqueFinAdvisor) 
are statistically significant. However, the differences are not significant for deregulation. 
Overall, the relationship between financial advisors and industry M&A waves is still robust 
taking into account an exogenous shock, though the effect of the exogenous shock is not 
statistically significant when deregulation is included in the regression. 
4.4 The interaction between financial advisors and industry shocks 
 
This section tests the second hypothesis with OLS regressions. Under this hypothesis, 
financial advisors are expected to consider industry shocks as opportunities to generate industry 
M&A waves. This is because industry shocks that shift industry structure introduce corporate 
clients to financial advisors and motivate financial advisors to persuade more companies to 
conduct M&A activity. Therefore, after industry shocks occur, financial advisors can take 
advantage of the effects of industry shocks to persuade companies to conduct M&A activity, 
which generates industry M&A waves. In this section, the interaction terms between unique 
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financial advisors and different industry shocks are added to the model to examine the 
relationship between the interactions and industry M&A waves as equation (4).  
𝑀&𝐴 𝑤𝑎𝑣ⅇ𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐹𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ (𝐹𝐴𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    (5) 
Table 10 reports the results of the interaction between unique financial advisors and broad 
industry shocks in the generation of industry M&A waves. Table 10, columns 1-3, show the 
regression results of the interaction between unique financial advisors and sales shocks 
(UniqueFinAdvisor*Sales shock) in predicting industry M&A waves. Columns 4-6 are the 
regression results for the interaction between unique financial advisors and cash flow shocks 
(UniqueFinAdvisor*Cash flow shock), and columns 7-9 report the results for the interactions 
between unique financial advisors and employment shocks (UniqueFinAdvisor*Employment 
shock).  
[Insert Table 10 approximately here] 
As reported in Table 10, the interaction term between financial advisors and broad 
industry shocks is positive and statistically significant in predicting the number of completed 
M&A transactions (Numdeals) and M&A announcements (NumTdeals), but there is no 
significant association with the transaction value of completed M&A deals (Deal value). For 
instance, from columns 1-3, the coefficient of the interaction (UniqueFinAdvisor*Sales shock) 
is 0.582 in predicting the number of completed M&A transactions (Numdeals), which is 
significant at the 5% level. The coefficient of UniqueFinAdvisor*Sales shock is 0.757 which 
is significant at the 1% level in predicting M&A announcements (NumTdeals). However, the 
coefficient of the interaction (UniqueFinAdvisor*Sales shock) is 0.23 and not significant in the 
prediction of the transaction value of completed M&A deals (Deal value). When cash flow 
shock and employment shock are separately included in the regressions, in columns 4-6 and 
columns 7-9, respectively, the coefficients of the interaction between financial advisors and 
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cash flow or employment shocks are similar to the coefficient of the interaction with sales 
shocks in both size and significance. However, in columns 4-6, the coefficients of cash flow 
shock become positive but insignificant. Overall, the empirical evidence in Table 10 supports 
the second hypothesis that financial advisors are an incremental factor to broad industry shocks 
in the generation of industry M&A waves.  
Apart from the results shown in Table 10, the coefficient of unique financial advisors 
(UniqueFinAdvisor) is positive and significant in predicting industry M&A waves. This is 
consistent with the first hypothesis. For the broad industry shock variables in the regression, 
the evidence of sales, cash flow and employment shocks is consistent with the prior work by 
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Harford (2005) and Powell and Yawson (2005).  
Table 11 reports the OLS regression results of interactions between financial advisors 
and specific industry shocks in the formation of industry M&A waves. Table 11, columns 1-3, 
present the results of the interaction between financial advisors and deregulation 
(UniqueFinAdvisor*Deregulation). Columns 4-6 show the regressions of the interaction 
between financial advisors and technology shock (UniqueFinAdvisor*RD). As shown in Table 
11, the coefficient of the interaction between financial advisors and deregulation 
(UniqueFinAdvisor*Deregulation) is positive and significant in predicting industry M&A 
waves. Deregulation events are created by official announcements so that financial advisors 
easily capture the announcements and the following news. Thus financial advisors can take 
advantage of deregulation events to generate M&A transactions. However, the coefficient of 
the interaction between financial advisors and technology shocks (UniqueFinAdvisor*RD) is 
not significant. This is because technology shocks are negatively related to industry M&A 
waves (Mitchell and Mulherin 1996). Therefore, technology shocks do not provide 
opportunities for financial advisors to encourage more companies into M&A activity.  
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 [Insert Table 11 approximately here] 
 
4.5 Additional analysis 
 
4.5.1 Alternative measurement of financial advisors   
 
The first additional analysis is using the other financial advisor variable to investigate the 
role of financial advisors in the generation of industry M&A waves. The second variable of 
financial advisors, NumFinAdvisor, is applied in this analysis rather than the unique financial 
advisors (UniqueFinAdvisor). NumFinAdvisor represents the total number of times that 
financial advisors participate in industry M&A activity. There are two reasons for conducting 
this additional analysis. First, the robustness of the positive association between financial 
advisors and industry M&A waves can be shown by using a different measurement of financial 
advisors. In previous sections, the unique financial advisors (UniqueFinAdvisor) variable has 
been used in all regression analyses. To eliminate measurement bias, NumFinAdvisor is now 
used to check the robustness of the relationship between financial advisors and industry M&A 
waves. Second, NumFinAdvisor measures financial advisors in a more comprehensive way than 
unique financial advisors (UniqueFinAdvisor). NumFinAdvisor not only captures the role of 
unique financial advisors in industry M&A waves but also the multiple M&A bids that each 
unique financial advisor handles. In other words, this variable includes the number of M&A 
bidder and target companies that are persuaded by financial advisors into M&A transactions. 
Therefore, it is necessary to use the second variable of financial advisors (NumFinAdvisor) to 
enable a test of whether the positive association between financial advisors and industry M&A 
waves is consistent.  
Table 12 provides empirical evidence that financial advisors are a determinant of industry 
M&A waves following broad industry shocks. Specifically, when sales shock is included in 
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the regression, as reported in columns 1-3, the coefficient of the participation of financial 
advisors (NumFinAdvisor) is positive and economically significant at the 1% level in predicting 
industry M&A waves. For example, all else being equal, a one-standard-deviation increase 
(55.50788) in the participation of financial advisors (NumFinAdvisor) leads to an average 
increase of 53 (0.961*55.50788) deals in the completed M&A transactions (Numdeals) and an 
average increase of 57 (1.021*55.50788) bids in M&A announcements (NumTdeals). When 
including cash flow or employment shocks in the regressions, the coefficients of the 
participation of financial advisors (NumFinAdvisor) remain positive and significant at the 1% 
level in predicting industry M&A waves. This additional empirical evidence supports the 
positive association between financial advisors and industry M&A waves in the baseline results, 
and the first hypothesis that the number of financial advisors is positively correlated with 
industry M&A waves. In addition, the coefficients of sales, cash flow and employment shocks 
are positive in predicting industry M&A waves, which is consistent with the work of Mitchell 
and Mulherin (1996), Harford (2005) and Powell and Yawson (2005). 
[Insert Table 12 approximately here] 
Table 13 reports the relationship between the participation of financial advisors and 
industry M&A waves following specific industry shocks. Table 13, columns 1-3, show the 
results when including deregulation shocks in the regressions. Table 13, columns 4-6, present 
the regression results when technology shocks are included. The coefficient of the participation 
of financial advisors (NumFinAdvisor) is positive and statistically significant in predicting 
industry M&A waves for both deregulation and technology shocks. For instance, as shown in 
columns 1 and 2, all else being equal, a one-standard-deviation increase (55.50788) in the 
participation times of financial advisors (NumFinAdvisor) predicts an average increase of 35 
(0.636*55.50788) deals in completed M&A transactions (Numdeals) and an average increase 
of 37 (0.667*55.50788) bids in M&A announcements (NumTdeals). The empirical results for 
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specific industry shocks show that the effect of financial advisors on industry M&A waves is 
still consistently positive and significant. The effects of specific shocks are consistent with 
prior findings (Mitchell and Mulherin 1996, Harford 2005, Powell and Yawson 2005).  
 [Insert Table 13 approximately here] 
After the analyses in the previous paragraphs, the positive association between financial 
advisors and industry M&A waves following industry shocks is established with consistency 
and robustness. The positive association between financial advisors and industry M&A waves 
has a strong implication that M&A advisory fees motivate financial advisors to contribute to 
the generation of industry M&A waves, as argued previously. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
expect that the industry-level M&A advisory fees have a positive association with industry 
M&A waves.   
In this analysis, industry-level M&A fees are used in the OLS regression to replace the 
unique financial advisors variable (UniqueFinAdvisor). The industry-level M&A fees are 
constructed as the log value of the annual total M&A advisory fees at the industry level. The 
results show a positive relationship between M&A fees and industry M&A waves either 
controlling for broad industry shocks or specific industry shocks. When broad industry shocks 
are controlled, seven regressions out of nine show a significant positive relationship between 
M&A fees and industry M&A waves. When specific industry shocks are controlled, five 
regressions out of six show a significant relationship between financial advisors and industry 
M&A waves. This evidence supports the argument that advisory M&A fees are the motivation 
for financial advisors to generate industry M&A waves.  
4.5.2 Financial advisors and the occurrence of industry M&A waves 
 
In the previous analyses, we show a positive relationship between financial advisors and 
industry M&A waves measured by the number of M&A bids and M&A transaction value 
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across time. However, the measurements of industry M&A waves in the previous analysis do 
not indicate when in fact industry M&A waves occur, or when industry M&A waves have the 
highest number of M&A transactions and transaction value. In this section, in order to address 
the inability of our previous analysis to demonstrate causation, we employ a dummy variable 
to measure the occurrence of industry M&A waves and investigate the relationship between 
financial advisors and the occurrence of M&A waves in a probit regression model.  
In this part, following Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), we consider each industry M&A 
wave to occur in the 2 consecutive years with the highest value of the number of M&A 
transactions or transaction value. We split the whole sample period into 4 parts: 1980s (1980-
1989), the 1990s (1990-1999), the 2000s (2000-2009) and the 2010s (2010-2017). This is 
because the different time periods are characterized by distinct M&A waves (Mitchell and 
Mulherin 1996, Harford 2005). In order to examine a consistent relationship between financial 
advisors and the occurrence of industry M&A waves, we create five dummy variables to 
measure the occurrence of industry M&A waves and estimate the following model:  
 
           𝑃(𝑤𝑎𝑣ⅇ𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐹𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡            (6) 
 
P(wave) represents the probability of the occurrence of an industry M&A wave in 
industry i and at year t. The first independent variable, FA, represents the number of unique 
financial advisors (UniqueFinAdvisor) in industry i and at year t. Another independent variable, 
Shock, captures industry shocks for industry i at year t-1. Industry shocks include sales shocks, 
cash flow shocks, employment shocks, deregulation and technology change. The control 
variables have market-to-book ratio (MB), 3-year return (Return), standard deviation of 3-year 
return (SD), debt-to-equity ratio (DE) and industry capitalization (Induscap).  
[Insert Table 14 approximately here] 
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Table 14 provides empirical evidence that financial advisors are an important factor in 
determining industry M&A waves when proxied by wavedummy1. The wavedummy1 is equal 
to 1 when the maximum number of completed M&A deals occurs in an industry in an adjacent 
two-year period within the 1980s, the 1990s, the 2000s and the 2010s respectively. Specifically, 
as shown in Table 14, the coefficients for unique financial advisors (UniqueFinAdvisor) are 
positive and economically significant at the 1% level in predicting the occurrence of industry 
M&A waves. For example, in column 1, all else being equal, one unit increases in unique 
financial advisors (UniqueFinAdvisor) leads to an average increase of 0.011 in wavedummy1 
which represents an industry M&A wave occurs or not. The evidence reported in Table 14 
supports the expectation that financial advisors play a critical role in the generation of industry 
M&A waves. 
However, as reported in Table 14, neither the coefficients of broad industry shocks nor 
specific industry shocks are significant in the probit models. This is because industry shocks 
are the initial trigger of industry M&A waves, and their effects in changing industry structure 
occur at the beginning stage of industry M&A waves. The dummy variables capture the 
occurrence of industry M&A waves at their peak because the maximum number is used in the 
construction of dummy variables. Thus, during the peak of industry M&A waves, industry 
shocks have no effect on the occurrence of industry M&A waves, because their impact has 
occurred at the beginning of the waves. Therefore, the evidence of industry shocks in Table 14 
is consistent with our expectation.  
 
[Insert Table 15 approximately here] 
Table 15 reports the evidence of a positive relationship between financial advisors and 
the occurrence of industry M&A waves when proxied by wavedummy3. The wavedummy3 is 
equal to 1 when the maximum average proportion of completed M&A deals occurs in an 
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adjacent two-year period in an industry within the 1980s, the 1990s, the 2000s and the 2010s 
respectively. The proportion of completed M&A deals is computed as the number of completed 
M&A deals divided by the number of firms across the sample period in an industry. As shown 
in Table 15, the coefficients of unique financial advisors (UniqueFinAdvisor) are positive and 
economically significant at the 1% level in predicting the occurrence of industry M&A waves, 
with the control of different industry shocks. For example, shown in column 1, the coefficient 
of unique financial advisors (UniqueFinAdvisor) is 0.014 when we control for sales shock. The 
results for industry shocks, presented in Table 15, show that sales shock and employment shock 
have positive coefficients, significant at the 10% level. However, the coefficient of cash flow 
shock is -0.044 which is significant at the 5% level. Deregulation and technology have no 
significant effects on the probability that an industry M&A wave will occur. The inconsistent 
result of industry shocks is because the dummy variable (wavedummy3) is affected by the 
number of companies who enter and leave industries across the sample period 2 . In the 
calculation of the proportion of completed M&A deals in creating dummy variable, we employ 
the number of companies across time, which is not constant.  
 
[Insert Table 16 approximately here] 
Table 16 reports the probit models which estimate the relationship between financial 
advisors and the probability of the occurrence of industry M&A waves represented by 
wavedummy5. The dummy variable, wavedummy5, is equal to 1 when the maximum M&A 
transaction volume occurs in an industry in an adjacent two-year period within the 1980s, the 
1990s, the 2000s and the 2010s respectively. As reported in Table 16, unique financial advisors 
(UniqueFinAdvisor) remain a significant and positive factor in predicting the occurrence of 
                                                     
2 The results of industry shocks are consistent with our expectation that industry shocks are insignificant in 
predicting the occurrence of industry M&A waves when we consider a fixed number of firms in 1980 in the 




industry M&A waves. The coefficients of UniqueFinAdvisor are significant at the 1% level. 
This evidence is consistent with our expectation that financial advisors are related to the 
occurrence of industry M&A waves. Furthermore, in Table 16, the coefficients of industry 
shocks, such as sales shock and deregulation, are insignificant in predicting the occurrence of 
industry M&A waves. This meets our expectation. However, in column 2, cash flow shock 
shows a negative coefficient of -0.035 at the 10% significance level.  
In order to confirm the consistency of the positive relationship between financial advisors 
and the occurrence of industry M&A waves, we employ wavedummy2 and wavedummy4 to 
measure the occurrence of industry M&A waves3. Appendix Table 7 shows the results of 
wavedummy2 as the dependent variable in probit models. As reported in Appendix Table 7, 
unique financial advisors (UniqueFinAdvisor) is an economically significant factor in 
predicting the occurrence of industry M&A waves with the control of different industry shocks. 
For example, when we control for sales shock, shown in column 1, the coefficient of 
UniqueFinAdvisor is 0.013, significant at the 1% level. The evidence of financial advisors in 
Appendix Table 7 continues to support the important role of financial advisors in the generation 
of industry M&A waves. Appendix Table 8 presents the results of probit models by employing 
wavedummy4 as the dependent variable. Similar to the results of Appendix Table 7, the 
coefficients of unique financial advisors (UniqueFinAdvisor) remain positive and significant 
at the 1% level. Furthermore, as shown in Appendix Table 7 and Appendix Table 8, the 
coefficients of different industry shocks, except for cash flow shock, are insignificant in these 
models. These results are consistent with our expectation that industry shocks have no 
significant impact on the prediction of the occurrence of industry M&A waves.   
                                                     
3 The wavedummy2 is equal to 1 when the maximum number of announced M&A deals occurs in an industry in 
an adjacent two-year period within the 1980s, the 1990s, the 2000s and the 2010s respectively. The 
wavedummy4 is created as 1 when the maximum fraction of M&A announcements occur in an adjacent two-
year period in an industry within the four time periods respectively. The fraction of M&A announcements is 






This study investigates the role of financial advisors in the generation of industry M&A 
waves following different industry shocks. This study is important since it is not only the first 
to investigate the role of financial advisors in industry M&A waves, but also this study supports 
and expands the neoclassical theory with a new component to explain industry M&A waves. 
In an analysis of an extensive sample of US M&A transactions, financial advisors are found to 
be a significant driver in the generation of industry M&A waves after industry shocks have 
occurred. The potential endogeneity issue of the relationship between financial advisors and 
industry M&A waves is addressed by the well-documented 2SLS regression approach and a 
subgroup analysis with an exogenous shock.  
Based on the effect of industry shocks, financial advisors contribute to the generation of 
industry M&A waves by persuading companies to be involved in M&A activity. The empirical 
evidence shows that the number of different financial advisor companies is positively 
correlated with industry M&A waves. This study also documents that the frequency of the 
participation of financial advisors in M&A activity is positively related to industry M&A waves. 
Furthermore, this study shows that the interaction between financial advisors and industry 
shocks is positively associated with industry M&A waves, suggesting that financial advisors 
collaborate with industry shocks to generate the industry M&A waves.   
Overall, this study provides novel evidence shedding new light on the explanation of 
industry M&A waves by financial advisors, which supports the neoclassical theory and 
expands the neoclassical theory with a new component: financial advisors explain industry 
M&A waves. The formation of an industry M&A wave occurs when a shock hits the industry 
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environment, and industry M&As are further encouraged by financial advisors, which causes 
the clustering of M&A activity at the industry level. 
Additionally, this study shows the effect and power of financial advisors at the industry 
level on the M&A market, given the evidence that the number of financial advisors is positively 
correlated with industry-level M&A waves and activity. This indicates that financial advisor 
companies are important financial intermediaries in the industry-level M&A market. Therefore, 
future research on financial advisors should focus on whether financial advisors involved in 






Ahern, K. R. and J. Harford (2014). "The importance of industry links in merger waves." The Journal 
of Finance 69(2): 527-576. 
  
Ahmad, M. F., et al. (2017). "International Trade and Propagation of Merger Waves." from 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2955638. 
  
Almeida, H., et al. (2011). "Liquidity mergers." Journal of Financial Economics 102(3): 526-558. 
  
Andrade, G., et al. (2001). "New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers." Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 15(2): 103-120. 
  
Ang, J. S. and Y. Cheng (2006). "Direct evidence on the market‐driven acquisition theory." Journal of 
Financial Research 29(2): 199-216. 
  
Bao, J. and A. Edmans (2011). "Do investment banks matter for M&A returns?" The Review of 
Financial Studies 24(7): 2286-2315. 
  
Bowers, H. M. and R. E. Miller (1990). "Choice of investment banker and shareholders' wealth of 
firms involved in acquisitions." Financial management: 34-44. 
  
Brealey, R., et al. (1988). Principles of Corporate Finance, 11e, McGraw-Hill Education. 
  
Brealey, R. A., et al. (2003). "Principles of Corporate Finance (New York, 2003)." McGraw-Hill 
Education. 
  
Calomiris, C. W. (1999). "Gauging the efficiency of bank consolidation during a merger wave." 
Journal of Banking & Finance 23(2-4): 615-621. 
  
Coase, R. H. (1937). "The nature of the firm." economica 4(16): 386-405. 
  
Dong, M., et al. (2006). "Does investor misvaluation drive the takeover market?" The Journal of 
Finance 61(2): 725-762. 
  
Duchin, R. and B. Schmidt (2013). "Riding the merger wave: Uncertainty, reduced monitoring, and 
bad acquisitions." Journal of Financial Economics 107(1): 69-88. 
  
Eisfeldt, A. L. and A. A. Rampini (2006). "Capital reallocation and liquidity." Journal of monetary 
Economics 53(3): 369-399. 
  





Fama, E. F. and J. D. MacBeth (1973). "Risk, return, and equilibrium: Empirical tests." Journal of 
Political Economy 81(3): 607-636. 
  
Firmex and Divestopedia (2017). M&A Fee Guide 2017. Available at 
https://www.firmex.com/resources/market-reports/ma-fee-guide-2017/. 
  
Garfinkel, J. A. and K. W. Hankins (2011). "The role of risk management in mergers and merger 
waves." Journal of Financial Economics 101(3): 515-532. 
  
Goel, A. M. and A. V. Thakor (2009). "Do envious CEOs cause merger waves?" The Review of 
Financial Studies 23(2): 487-517. 
  
Golubov, A., et al. (2012). "When it pays to pay your investment banker: New evidence on the role of 
financial advisors in M&As." The Journal of Finance 67(1): 271-311. 
  
Gort, M. (1969). "An economic disturbance theory of mergers." The Quarterly Journal of Economics: 
624-642. 
  
Harford, J. (2005). "What drives merger waves?" Journal of Financial Economics 77(3): 529-560. 
  
Harford, J., et al. (2009). "Do firms have leverage targets? Evidence from acquisitions." Journal of 
Financial Economics 93(1): 1-14. 
  
Hunter, W. C. and J. Jagtiani (2003). "An analysis of advisor choice, fees, and effort in mergers and 
acquisitions." Review of Financial Economics 12(1): 65-81. 
  
Hunter, W. C. and M. B. Walker (1990). "An empirical examination of investment banking merger fee 
contracts." Southern Economic Journal: 1117-1130. 
  
Ismail, A. (2010). "Are good financial advisors really good? The performance of investment banks in 
the M&A market." Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 35(4): 411-429. 
  
Jovanovic, B. and P. L. Rousseau (2002). "The Q-theory of mergers." American Economic Review 
92(2): 198-204. 
  
Kale, J. R., et al. (2003). "Financial advisors and shareholder wealth gains in corporate takeovers." 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38(3): 475-501. 
  
Khatami, S. H., et al. (2015). "Corporate acquisitions and financial constraints." International Review 




McLaughlin, R. M. (1990). "Investment-banking contracts in tender offers: An empirical analysis." 
Journal of Financial Economics 28(1-2): 209-232. 
  
McLaughlin, R. M. (1992). "Does the form of compensation matter?: Investment banker fee 
contracts in tender offers." Journal of Financial Economics 32(2): 223-260. 
  
Mitchell, M. L. and J. H. Mulherin (1996). "The impact of industry shocks on takeover and 
restructuring activity." Journal of Financial Economics 41(2): 193-229. 
  
Mulherin, J. H. and A. L. Boone (2000). "Comparing acquisitions and divestitures." Journal of 
Corporate Finance 6(2): 117-139. 
  
Ovtchinnikov, A. V. (2010). "Capital structure decisions: Evidence from deregulated industries." 
Journal of Financial Economics 95(2): 249-274. 
  
Ovtchinnikov, A. V. (2013). "Merger waves following industry deregulation." Journal of Corporate 
Finance 21: 51-76. 
  
Powell, R. and A. Yawson (2005). "Industry aspects of takeovers and divestitures: Evidence from the 
UK." Journal of Banking & Finance 29(12): 3015-3040. 
  
Rhodes‐Kropf, M. and S. Viswanathan (2004). "Market valuation and merger waves." The Journal of 
Finance 59(6): 2685-2718. 
  
Rhodes–Kropf, M., et al. (2005). "Valuation waves and merger activity: The empirical evidence." 
Journal of Financial Economics 77(3): 561-603. 
  
Servaes, H. and M. Zenner (1996). "The role of investment banks in acquisitions." The Review of 
Financial Studies 9(3): 787-815. 
  
Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny (2003). "Stock market driven acquisitions." Journal of Financial 
Economics 70(3): 295-311. 
  
Stahl, J. C. (2016). "Effects of deregulation and consolidation of the broadcast television industry." 
American Economic Review 106(8): 2185-2218. 
  
Tully, K. (2003). "M&A revival without investment bankers." Retrieved 2019/07/30, 2019, from 
https://www.euromoney.com/article/b1320qjb1l3jn6/ma-revival-without-investment-bankers. 
  
Viscusi, W. K., et al. (2005). Economics of regulation and antitrust, MIT press. 
  
Walter, T. S., et al. (2008). "The role of investment banks in M&A transactions: Fees and services." 






Table 1 The time interval (days) between M&A deal announcement and M&A deal completion.  
 
Industry 
Abbreviation Industry full name Average Median 
Standard 
Derivation 
AGRIC Agriculture 88.5949 52 106.1854 
AERO Aircraft  71.9786 48 68.2310 
BEER Alcoholic beverages 76.1386 55 78.3209 
CLTHS Apparel 63.2703 45 67.7555 
AUTOS Automobile and Trucks 84.6893 60 91.3180 
BANKS Banking 156.5842 151 123.1915 
BUSSV Business Service 67.1482 46 88.8218 
PAPER Business Supplies 81.7445 52.5 139.2092 
SODA Candy and Soda 89.9037 60 95.2916 
CHEMS Chemicals 90.4600 64 95.7061 
COAL Coal 91.6185 44 184.2664 
COMPS Computer 75.0856 59 71.6041 
CNSTR Construction 63.9779 39 94.3833 
BLDMT Construction Material 72.1146 47 102.5864 
HSHLD Customer Goods 76.8500 53 96.3465 
GUNS Defences 94.8265 69 98.2896 
DRUGS Pharmaceutical products 81.3937 50 118.1856 
ELCEQ Electrical equipment 70.9361 50 82.3545 
CHIPS Electronic equipment 82.9028 60 94.5326 
FUN Entertainment 115.0991 77 128.1610 
FABPR Fabricated products 82.1163 46 121.9617 
FOOD Food 85.6388 49 122.3394 
HLTH Healthcare 90.2027 68 94.7401 
INSUR Insurance 115.5544 101 95.3857 
MACH Machinery 69.6096 49.5 75.9413 
LABEQ Measuring and Control equip 77.1467 56 93.1897 
MEDEQ Medical equipment 81.9435 58 109.4875 
OTHER Miscellaneous 109.9677 65 117.1338 
MINES Non-metallic mining 94.1551 55 166.1751 
PERSV Personal services 72.7709 48 92.2490 
ENRGY(OIL) Petroleum and natural gas 73.7591 48 97.0761 
GOLD Precious metals 129.6000 69 261.1269 
BOOKS Printing and Publishing 87.8070 52 150.5346 
RLEST Real Estate 35.8864 68 108.1666 
TOYS Recreational Products 72.6749 55 71.5768 
MEALS Restaurants 74.7088 36 149.8547 
RTAIL Retail  82.4253 56 101.1412 
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RUBBR Rubber and Plastic products 64.0058 43 95.6445 
SHIPS Shipbuilding 99.3966 56 117.1265 
BOXES Shipping container 77.6927 57 124.3041 
STEEL Steel work 86.0153 58 92.9798 
TELCM Telecommunication 146.1707 119 138.5454 
TXTLS Textiles 83.1123 63 83.9127 
SMOKE Tobacco 108.4500 84.5 91.9305 
FIN Trading 83.4745 49 116.6918 
TRANS Transportation 89.4100 56 112.5560 
UTIL Utilities 136.0734 81 161.7898 





Table 2 Descriptive Statistics  
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the sample 1980-2017. Numdeals and NumTdeals represent the 
number of completed transactions and the number of completed plus withdrawn deals, respectively. Deal value 
is the US dollar value of completed M&A transactions ($ billions). UniqueFinAdvisor is the number of unique 
financial advisors participating in M&A deals. This variable is computed as the sum of financial advisor 
companies participating in M&A deals without duplicate company names. NumFinAdvisor is the number of 
times that financial advisors participate in industry M&A activity. MarketFinAdvisor is the total financial 
advisors in the economy computed as the sum of UniqueFinAdvisor among all industries (removing duplicate 
companies). Sales shock, Cash flow shock and Employment shock represent the measures of broad industry 
shocks separately. All three measures are calculated over a 5-year rolling period, starting in 1975. Sales growth, 
Cash flow growth, and Employee growth are measured over the 5-year period before each sample year. Others 
are control variables as described in Appendix Table 1. The number of observations represents the number of 
industry-years without missing data. 
 Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev. Min Max 
 Numdeals 1824 28.53235 55.86510 0 575 
 NumTdeals 1824 31.04825 59.64202 0 620 
 Deal value 1824 18.46799 45.02636 0 691.7379 
 UniqueFinAdvisor 1824 16.52138 17.82574 0 150 
 NumFinAdvisor 1824 33.94353 55.50788 0 556 
 MarketFinAdvisor 1824 174.2105 68.37276 30 283 
 Sales shock 1824 0.342715 0.315865 0.000294 2.803605 
 Cash flow shock 1246 1.327545 4.394949 0.000808 93.07722 
 Employment shock 1824 0.258717 0.568062 0.000040 8.292441 
 Sales growth 1824 0.355644 0.370089 -1.008467 2.828052 
 Cash flow growth 1247 0.961328 4.509154 -14.30439 93.14874 
 Employment growth 1824 0.141078 0.616603 -1.305611 8.317711 
 Deregulation 1824 0.154605 0.361627 0 1 
 RD 1824 0.584528 5.116178 0 123.1701 
 Induscap 1783 10.77337 2.045345 -4.201351 15.45218 
 return 1824 0.464133 0.421868 -1.468284 2.520890 
 MB 1824 1.854727 0.884875 0.286519 13.79310 
 SD 1824 0.066127 0.025899 0.020001 0.212278 




Table 3 Matrix of correlations 
The table reports a correlation matrix for the sample period 1980-2017. The observations used in the calculation of correlation are on an industry-year basis without missing 
values.  
  Variables   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   (12)   (13)   (14)   (15)   (16)   (17)   (18) 
 (1) Numdeals 1.000 
 (2) NumTdeals 0.999 1.000 
 (3) Deal value 0.841 0.846 1.000 
 (4) UniqueFinAdvisor 0.877 0.879 0.800 1.000 
 (5) NumFinAdvisor 0.913 0.912 0.856 0.952 1.000 
 (6) Sales shock 0.064 0.069 0.033 -0.021 0.024 1.000 
 (7) Cash flow shock 0.182 0.191 0.128 0.108 0.124 0.102 1.000 
 (8) Employment shock -0.046 -0.044 -0.062 -0.127 -0.083 0.464 0.011 1.000 
 (9) Sales growth 0.103 0.109 0.062 0.054 0.074 0.792 0.105 0.350 1.000 
 (10) Cash flow growth 0.051 0.049 0.030 -0.006 0.028 0.053 0.817 0.003 0.067 1.000 
 (11) Employment growth -0.001 -0.000 -0.019 -0.040 -0.018 0.437 0.041 0.682 0.499 0.038 1.000 
 (12) deregulation 0.128 0.130 0.243 0.235 0.228 -0.020 -0.050 -0.077 0.021 -0.008 -0.019 1.000 
 (13) RD 0.038 0.039 0.109 0.097 0.092 -0.023 -0.027 -0.044 -0.006 -0.013 -0.016 0.183 1.000 
 (14) induscap 0.415 0.413 0.446 0.563 0.520 -0.153 -0.051 -0.219 -0.008 -0.016 -0.067 0.369 0.156 1.000 
 (15) return 0.091 0.091 0.093 0.090 0.102 0.088 -0.018 0.017 0.159 -0.022 0.012 -0.000 0.020 0.117 1.000 
 (16) MB 0.024 0.021 0.089 0.025 0.061 -0.006 -0.065 -0.001 0.030 -0.015 -0.000 -0.120 0.228 0.186 0.382 1.000 
 (17) SD -0.122 -0.126 -0.128 -0.153 -0.114 0.095 -0.053 0.044 -0.017 -0.024 0.014 -0.111 0.047 -0.108 0.033 -0.006 1.000 







Table 4 OLS regressions of unique financial advisors in M&A waves following broad industry shocks 
The table reports OLS regressions of the unique financial advisors in M&A waves on measures of broad industry shocks. Three different measures of broad industry shock 
and growth (sales, cash flow and employment) are used. All explanatory and control variables are measured at year t-1, except for UniqueFinAdvisor. UniqueFinAdvisor is 
the number of unique financial advisors, which is computed as the sum of financial advisors participating M&A deals in a year minus the multiple times for each financial 
advisor in different M&A deals. Each regression uses 48 industries, each over 38 years (1980-2017). ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively, using a two-tail test. The numbers in parentheses are p-values.  
 Sales shock  Cash Flow shock  Employment shock 
 Numdeals NumTdeals Deal 
value 
 Numdeals NumTdeals Deal 
value 
 Numdeals NumTdeals Deal 
value 
UniqueFinAdvisor 2.984*** 3.187*** 2.097***  3.072*** 3.221*** 2.189***  2.994*** 3.198*** 2.108*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales shock 13.043*** 12.755*** 11.914***         
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
Sales growth -3.980 -2.114 -7.926***         
 (0.118) (0.426) (0.000)         
Cash flow shock     1.176** 1.660** 0.305     
     (0.049) (0.013) (0.536)     
Cash flow growth     -0.038 -0.396 0.633     
     (0.948) (0.550) (0.273)     
Employment shock         7.739*** 7.222*** 10.509*** 
         (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Employment growth         -4.582*** -3.922** -8.517*** 
         (0.003) (0.015) (0.000) 
Induscap -2.980*** -3.535*** -0.594  -3.619*** -3.837*** -0.340  -3.045*** -3.650*** -0.445 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.363)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.650)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.457) 
Return 2.666* 3.331** 2.938**  0.902 1.433 0.234  3.185** 4.031*** 3.022** 
 (0.056) (0.025) (0.036)  (0.661) (0.503) (0.910)  (0.020) (0.005) (0.030) 
MB -0.329 -0.567 2.513***  0.907 1.038 3.811***  -0.304 -0.526 2.541*** 
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 (0.651) (0.472) (0.002)  (0.303) (0.247) (0.001)  (0.663) (0.484) (0.002) 
SD 8.980 -5.598 -36.174  17.572 10.382 -39.876  13.073 -1.415 -34.466 
 (0.697) (0.816) (0.168)  (0.512) (0.707) (0.201)  (0.571) (0.953) (0.193) 
DE 0.024 0.719 -1.344**  0.049 0.417 -0.910  0.184 0.916 -1.288** 
 (0.968) (0.278) (0.034)  (0.961) (0.705) (0.432)  (0.761) (0.164) (0.041) 
Constant 6.183 10.749** -13.177**  10.207 10.938 -19.518***  7.602* 13.143*** -15.512*** 
 (0.183) (0.037) (0.014)  (0.173) (0.163) (0.003)  (0.092) (0.009) (0.001) 
            
N 1736 1736 1736  1174 1174 1174  1736 1736 1736 
R2 0.783 0.788 0.639  0.784 0.789 0.652  0.782 0.786 0.640 
adj. R2 0.782 0.787 0.637  0.783 0.787 0.650  0.781 0.785 0.639 
F 115.053 116.507 74.748  82.195 82.793 70.585  122.443 123.654 77.475 
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Table 5 Major Economic Deregulatory Initiatives, 1980-2017  
 
 
This table lists the major deregulatory initiatives during the sample period. This table is adapted from Viscusi, 
Harrington Jr, and Vernon (2005), Economic of Regulation and Antitrust, Tables 10.3 and 10.4 on page 368 
and 370 respectively, which list deregulation events up to 2002. Information about deregulation initiatives 
from 2002 to 2017 is sourced from the US annual Economic Report of the President 
(https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/45) 
Year  Initiatives Industry affected 
1980 Motor Carrier Reform Act Transportation  
 Household Goods Transportation Act Transportation 
 Staggers Rail Act Transportation 
 Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control 
Act 
Banking 
 International Air Transportation Competition Act Transportation 
 Deregulation of cable television (FCC) Telecommunication 
 Deregulation of customer premises equipment and enhanced 
services (FCC) 
Telecommunication 




 Deregulation of radio (FCC) Telecommunication 
1982 Bus Regulatory Reform Act Transportation 
 Garn–St. Germain Depository Institutions Act Banking 
 AT&T settlement Telecommunication 
1984 Space commercialization Telecommunication 
 Cable Television Deregulation Act Telecommunication 
 Shipping Act Transportation 
1986 Trading of airport landing rights Transportation 
1987 Sale of Conrail Transportation 
 Elimination of fairness doctrine (FCC) Telecommunication 
1988 Proposed rules on natural gas and electricity (FERC) Utilities 
 Proposed rules on price caps (FCC) Telecommunication 
1989 Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989 Petroleum and 
Natural Gas 
1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act  Insurance 
1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act Entertainment 
 Energy Policy  Petroleum and 
Natural Gas 
 FERC Order 636 Utilities 
1993 Elimination of state regulation of cellular telephone rates Telecommunication 
 Negotiated Rates Act Transportation 
1994 Trucking Industry and Regulatory Reform Act Transportation 
 Riegle-Neal interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act Banking 
1995 ICC termination Act Transportation 
1996 Telecommunication Act  Telecommunication 




1999 FERC Order 2000 Utilities 
 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Banking 
2003 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act 
Drugs 
 Energy policy in Electricity Transmission Grid Utilities 
2004 Airline Computer Reservation Systems Deregulation Transportation 
2005 Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management 
Act 
Agriculture  
2008 Deregulation of Broadband service providers (FCC) Telecommunication 
 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act Insurance 
2009 Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical 
Health Act 
Healthcare 
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Table 6 OLS regressions of unique financial advisors in M&A waves following specific industry shocks 
The table reports OLS regressions of the unique financial advisors in M&A waves on measures of specific industry shocks. UniqueFinAdvisor is the number of unique 
financial advisors computed as the sum of financial advisors participating M&A deals in a year minus the multiple times for each financial advisor in different M&A 
deals. Two different measures of shock (deregulation and technology change) are used. Deregulation is a dummy variable for 10 industries experiencing major federal 
deregulation: agriculture, banking, drugs, entertainment, healthcare, insurance, petroleum and natural gas, telecommunication, transportation and utility. Each industry 
covers all of the sample period (1980-2017). Technology change is measured by industry average research and development expense/sales ratio at year t-1. The regressions 
on technology change use 48 industries, each over 38 years (1980-2017). ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, using a two-
tail test. The numbers in parentheses are p-values.  
 Deregulation  Technology 
 Numdeals NumTdeals Deal value  Numdeals NumTdeals Deal value 
UniqueFinAdvisor 1.950*** 2.039*** 2.090***  2.998*** 3.201*** 2.087*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Deregulation 6.140*** 7.102*** 11.722***     
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.006)     
RD     -0.467*** -0.464*** 0.516** 
     (0.000) (0.001) (0.025) 
Induscap 0.501 -0.319 3.470*  -3.279*** -3.869*** -0.911 
 (0.568) (0.739) (0.092)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.158) 
Return 5.939** 5.167* 5.307  2.654** 3.517** 3.092** 
 (0.024) (0.059) (0.206)  (0.049) (0.014) (0.021) 
MB -1.355 -0.844 6.082  0.395 0.182 1.945** 
 (0.329) (0.568) (0.110)  (0.548) (0.797) (0.013) 
SD 46.073 39.188 -62.177  23.854 9.060 -30.335 
 (0.307) (0.388) (0.405)  (0.295) (0.703) (0.245) 
DE 0.010 0.351 -2.290***  0.198 0.933 -1.170* 
 (0.972) (0.314) (0.000)  (0.744) (0.156) (0.067) 
Constant -19.548** -9.468 -69.788***  9.916** 15.237*** -8.329 
 (0.037) (0.344) (0.000)  (0.028) (0.002) (0.102) 
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N 342 342 342  1736 1736 1736 
R2 0.778 0.761 0.500  0.782 0.786 0.640 
adj. R2 0.774 0.756 0.490  0.781 0.786 0.639 
F 141.309 122.456 32.812  116.203 115.845 86.945 
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Table 7 IV-2SLS regression with broad industry shocks 
This table presents IV-2SLS regressions of the unique financial advisors in M&A waves with three types of broad industry shocks (sales shock, cash flow shock and employment 
shocks). The first stage regressions are in columns 1, 5, and 9. The instrumental variable used in the first stage regression is MarketFinAdvisor which represents the yearly total 
number of financial advisors in the market. MarketFinAdvisor is calculated as the sum of UniqueFinAdvisor in all industries without replicating company name in each sample 
period (1980-2017). Except for instrumented UniqueFinAdvisor and MarketFinAdvisor, other explanatory and control variables are measured at year t-1. ***, **, and * 
represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, using a two-tail test. The numbers in parentheses are p-values.    
 Sales shock  Cash flow shock  Employment shock 
 First-stage Second-stage  First-stage Second-stage  First-stage Second-stage 
 UniqueFinAdvisor Numdeals NumTdeals Deal 
value 
 UniqueFinAdvisor Numdeals NumTdeals Deal value  UniqueFinAdvisor Numdeals NumTdeals Deal value 
UniqueFinAdvisor   2.552*** 2.326*** 2.154***   4.176*** 4.129*** 4.192***   2.414*** 2.129*** 2.176*** 
(Instrumented)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MarketFinAdvisor  0.037***     0.050***     0.036***    
(Instrumental) (0.000)     (0.005)     (0.000)    
Sales shock          -0.190 13.531*** 13.728*** 11.849***           
 (0.917) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)           
Sales growth 1.750 -4.104 -2.363 -7.909***           
 (0.214) (0.115) (0.406) (0.000)           
Cash flow shock      1.477*** -0.382 0.379 -2.521*      
      (0.000) (0.761) (0.755) (0.093)      
Cash flow growth      -1.024*** 1.112 0.549 2.720**      
      (0.001) (0.280) (0.593) (0.029)      
Employment shock           -3.199*** 6.058*** 4.128** 10.708*** 
           (0.003) (0.000) (0.050) (0.000) 
Employment growth           2.359** -3.290** -1.544 -8.670*** 
           (0.015) (0.031) (0.406) (0.000) 
Induscap 4.352*** -0.904 0.610 -0.870  5.568*** -9.931** -9.026** -11.790**  4.203*** -0.339 1.332 -0.766 
 (0.000) (0.566) (0.711) (0.473)  (0.000) (0.034) (0.048) (0.028)  (0.000) (0.823) (0.408) (0.522) 
Return 1.774** 2.812** 3.622** 2.919**  1.987* -1.194 -0.290 -3.569  1.814** 3.354** 4.343*** 3.002** 
 (0.030) (0.037) (0.014) (0.036)  (0.054) (0.654) (0.912) (0.287)  (0.026) (0.011) (0.004) (0.029) 
MB -1.171*** -0.508 -0.925 2.536***  -1.321** 2.164 2.071 6.090***  -1.088** -0.526 -0.935 2.567*** 
 (0.009) (0.402) (0.125) (0.001)  (0.011) (0.164) (0.163) (0.001)  (0.016) (0.350) (0.115) (0.001) 
SD -40.936*** -8.401 -40.304 -33.863  -31.580** 53.493 39.913 25.290  -38.238*** -8.343 -40.841 -31.926 
 (0.004) (0.710) (0.100) (0.217)  (0.034) (0.148) (0.268) (0.619)  (0.007) (0.712) (0.107) (0.246) 
DE 1.886*** 0.820 2.307*** -1.450**  1.879*** -1.991 -1.260 -4.612**  1.940*** 1.274 2.923*** -1.417** 
 (0.000) (0.292) (0.008) (0.020)  (0.000) (0.237) (0.459) (0.022)  (0.000) (0.108) (0.001) (0.028) 
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Constant -35.560*** -8.585 -18.739 -11.213  -53.206*** 58.882 50.955 68.785  -33.072*** -11.089 -21.267* -13.295 
 (0.000) (0.479) (0.137) (0.244)  (0.000) (0.122) (0.169) (0.115)  (0.000) (0.333) (0.079) (0.144) 
               
N 1736 1736 1736 1736  1174 1174 1174 1174  1736 1736 1736 1736 
R2 0.378 0.771 0.747 0.638  0.396 0.717 0.748 0.320  0.379 0.761 0.723 0.640 
adj. R2 0.375 0.770 0.745 0.637  0.392 0.715 0.746 0.315  0.376 0.760 0.722 0.638 
F 63.369     40.276     80.761    
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Table 8 IV-2SLS regression with specific industry shocks  
This table presents IV-2SLS regressions of the unique financial advisors in M&A waves with two types of specific industry shocks (deregulation and technology change). The 
first stage regressions are in columns 1, 5, and 9. The instrumental variable used in the first stage regression is MarketFinAdvisor which represents the yearly total number of 
financial advisors in the market. MarketFinAdvisor is calculated as the sum of UniqueFinAdvisor in all industries without replicating company names in each sample period 
(1980-2017). Except for instrumented UniqueFinAdvisor and MarketFinAdvisor, other explanatory and control variables are measured at year t-1. ***, **, and * represent 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, using a two-tail test. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. 
 Deregulation  Technology change  
 First-stage Second stage  First-stage Second stage 
 UniqueFinAdvisor Numdeals NumTdeals Deal value  UniqueFinAdvisor Numdeals NumTdeals Deal value 
UniqueFinAdvisor  1.555*** 1.405*** 1.561***   2.410*** 2.132*** 2.304*** 
(Instrumented)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MarketFinAdvisor 0.074***     0.037***    
(Instrumental) (0.000)     (0.000)    
Deregulation -0.121 6.802*** 8.163*** 12.607***      
 (0.912) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005)      
RD      0.213*** -0.356*** -0.261** 0.475** 
      (0.000) (0.004) (0.028) (0.041) 
Induscap 4.420*** 3.054** 3.775*** 6.882***  4.274*** -0.495 1.194 -1.939 
 (0.000) (0.016) (0.010) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.744) (0.460) (0.126) 
Return 2.700* 6.441** 5.973** 5.979  2.069** 2.950** 4.055*** 2.983** 
 (0.051) (0.014) (0.034) (0.147)  (0.011) (0.022) (0.005) (0.027) 
MB 2.072*** -0.299 0.851 7.494*  -1.382*** 0.024 -0.493 2.082*** 
 (0.001) (0.852) (0.639) (0.087)  (0.002) (0.965) (0.411) (0.007) 
SD 9.946 43.611 35.239 -65.468  -42.552*** -0.101 -34.498 -21.489 
 (0.633) (0.345) (0.467) (0.391)  (0.002) (0.996) (0.168) (0.439) 
DE 1.714*** 0.582 1.268*** -1.526**  1.945*** 1.306* 2.949*** -1.579** 
 (0.000) (0.105) (0.003) (0.026)  (0.000) (0.098) (0.001) (0.017) 
Constant -52.200*** -44.908*** -50.147*** -103.688***  -33.843*** -9.438 -19.955 -1.183 
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 (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.411) (0.101) (0.903) 
          
N 342 342 342 342  1736 1736 1736 1736 
R2 0.663 0.767 0.734 0.491  0.380 0.760 0.723 0.636 
adj. R2 0.656 0.762 0.728 0.480  0.378 0.759 0.722 0.634 




Table 9 Pre and Post effects on financial advisors with broad industry shocks in OLS regressions 
This table reports OLS regressions of the pre- and post-change effects of the Financial Modernization Act 1999 on industry M&A waves with broad industry shocks. The 
Financial Modernization Act was issued and implemented in 1999. The sample period (1980-2017) is divided into two: the pre-change period (1980-1998) and the post-change 
period (1999-2017). Columns (1), (3), (5) represent the regressions in the pre-change period, and columns (2), (4), (6) use the observations in the post-change period4. Panel A 
reports regressions for sales shocks. Panel B reports regressions for cash flow shocks. Panel C reports regressions for employment shocks. All explanatory and control variables 
are measured at year t-1, except for UniqueFinAdvisor. UniqueFinAdvisor is the number of unique financial advisors computed as the sum of financial advisors participating 
M&A deals in a year minus the multiple times for each financial advisor in different M&A deals. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, 
using a two-tail test. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. 
       
Panel A: sales shocks      
 Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Numdeals Numdeals NumTdeals NumTdeals Deal value Deal value 
UniqueFinAdvisor   2.391
***  3.187***   2.784***  3.345***   1.246***  2.333*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales shock 5.088 17.120
*** 5.057 18.233*** 4.940* 12.960*** 
 (0.275) (0.005) (0.135) (0.000) (0.094) (0.000) 
Sales growth -2.080 -3.366 -0.590 -2.491 -3.999
* -5.891** 
 (0.618) (0.512) (0.819) (0.515) (0.076) (0.029) 
Induscap -1.266
*** -4.138*** -1.706*** -4.443*** -0.224 -0.889 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.465) (0.410) 
Return 1.563 1.688 2.092 1.860 2.516
* 1.370 
 (0.314) (0.534) (0.169) (0.456) (0.063) (0.568) 
MB -0.873 1.165 -2.458
** 1.331 0.944 4.568*** 
 (0.382) (0.349) (0.013) (0.182) (0.235) (0.001) 
                                                     
4 The difference of the effects of UniqueFinAdvisor between the pre and post-change groups is tested by the Wald test. In Panel A, the p-values of the Wald test are: 0.0019 
(column 1 and 2); 0.0564 (column 3 and 4); 0.0001(column 5 and 6). In Panel B, the p-values of the Wald test are: 0.0776 (column 1 and 2); 0.1215 (column 3 and 4); 
0.0004(column 5 and 6). In Panel C, the p-values of the Wald test are: 0.0015 (column 1 and 2); 0.0483 (column 3 and 4); 0.0001(column 5 and 6).  
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SD 0.100 1.264 16.685 -3.742 -32.296 -85.865
** 
 (0.998) (0.973) (0.614) (0.908) (0.188) (0.018) 
DE 0.949
*** 0.316 1.344** 0.637 0.100 -0.838 
 (0.004) (0.667) (0.013) (0.603) (0.818) (0.421) 
Constant -0.120 11.322 2.580 12.310 -6.188
** -14.650 
 (0.979) (0.191) (0.604) (0.257) (0.036) (0.148) 
       
N 843 893 843 893 843 893 
R2 0.774 0.789 0.773 0.793 0.491 0.680 
adj. R2 0.772 0.787 0.771 0.791 0.486 0.677 
F 356.407 413.829 61.765 79.357 12.644 55.562 
       
Panel B: cash flow shocks      
 Pre   Post Pre Post Pre Post 
 (1)   (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Numdeals   Numdeals NumTdeals NumTdeals Deal value Deal value 
UniqueFinAdvisor 2.520
***   3.000*** 2.684*** 3.123*** 1.319*** 2.163*** 
 (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash flow shock 3.122   2.831
*** 3.892 3.535*** -0.346 2.388** 
 (0.157)   (0.000) (0.101) (0.000) (0.819) (0.031) 
Cash flow growth -3.045   1.957
*** -3.823 1.879*** 0.144 2.081** 
 (0.162)   (0.000) (0.103) (0.003) (0.922) (0.044) 
Induscap -1.691
* -3.437*** -1.696* -3.502*** 0.660 -0.206 
 (0.077) (0.000) (0.092) (0.000) (0.382) (0.743) 
Return -5.607 2.010 -4.853 2.238 -2.834 0.936 
 (0.139) (0.383) (0.229) (0.349) (0.598) (0.676) 
MB 2.219 1.017 1.933 1.188 3.284 4.479
*** 




* 13.065 -203.714* 10.642 -125.855 -80.774** 
 (0.064) (0.660) (0.059) (0.725) (0.128) (0.021) 
DE 0.532 -0.462 0.799 -0.298 3.068 -1.684 
 (0.697) (0.531) (0.613) (0.710) (0.224) (0.134) 
Constant 9.625   8.030 10.205 6.969 -16.701
* -18.930*** 
 (0.448)   (0.402) (0.444) (0.474) (0.077) (0.004) 
       
N 281   893 281 893 281 893 
R2 0.775   0.808 0.784 0.815 0.519 0.707 
adj. R2 0.769   0.806 0.777 0.813 0.505 0.704 
F 30.394   110.598 30.332 110.812 12.056 63.714 
       
Panel C: Employment Shocks      
 Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Numdeals Numdeals NumTdeals NumTdeals Deal value Deal value 
UniqueFinAdvisor 2.392
*** 3.203*** 2.783*** 3.363*** 1.249*** 2.344*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Employment shock 3.848
** 12.596*** 2.784 13.310*** 4.938*** 13.657*** 
 (0.033) (0.000) (0.165) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Employment growth -3.024
* -3.456 -1.718 -3.514 -4.423*** -8.278*** 
 (0.074) (0.140) (0.366) (0.157) (0.000) (0.007) 
Induscap -1.288*** -4.018*** -1.774*** -4.324*** -0.186 -0.609 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.518) (0.527) 
Return 1.751 2.196 2.264 2.577 2.718** 1.505 
 (0.197) (0.359) (0.146) (0.302) (0.048) (0.524) 
MB -0.567 1.030 -2.126** 1.172 1.180 4.433*** 
 (0.453) (0.273) (0.034) (0.227) (0.146) (0.001) 
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SD -7.407 10.977 12.329 7.219 -43.169* -79.516** 
 (0.782) (0.728) (0.717) (0.825) (0.086) (0.031) 
DE 1.031** 0.336 1.463*** 0.685 0.127 -0.845 
 (0.015) (0.771) (0.005) (0.586) (0.762) (0.424) 
Constant 0.249 10.662 3.904 11.887 -7.055*** -18.213** 
 (0.953) (0.307) (0.434) (0.281) (0.010) (0.040) 
       
N 843 893 843 893 843 893 
R2 0.774 0.788 0.773 0.792 0.493 0.681 
adj. R2 0.772 0.786 0.771 0.790 0.488 0.678 






Table 10 OLS regressions of the interactions between financial advisors and broad industry shocks 
This table presents OLS regression estimates of the unique financial advisors and the interaction between financial advisors and broad industry shocks. UniqueFinAdvisor is 
the number of unique financial advisors computed as the sum of financial advisors participating M&A deals in a year minus the multiple times for each financial advisor in 
different M&A deals. UniqueFinAdvisor *Sales shock, UniqueFinAdvisor *Cash flow shock, and UniqueFinAdvisor *Employment shock are the three interaction terms of 
UniqueFinAdvisor with three shock measures with a one-year lag (sales shock, cash flow shock and employment shock). Each regression uses 48 industries, each over 38 
years (1980-2017). All shock and control variables are measured in year t-1. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, using a two-
tail test. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. 
 Sales shock  Cash flow shock  Employment shock 
 Numdeals NumTdeals Deal value  Numdeals NumTdeals Deal value  Numdeals NumTdeals Deal value 
UniqueFinAdvisor 2.815*** 2.967*** 2.029***  2.908*** 3.021*** 2.110***  2.875*** 3.053*** 2.122*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UniqueFinAdvisor*Sales shock 0.582** 0.757*** 0.232         
 (0.038) (0.009) (0.467)         
Sales shock 7.067* 4.981 9.535***         
 (0.062) (0.203) (0.005)         
Sales growth -4.565* -2.875 -8.159***         
 (0.068) (0.270) (0.000)         
UniqueFinAdvisor*Cash flow shock     0.605** 0.737*** 0.293     
     (0.019) (0.006) (0.315)     
Cash flow shock     0.713 1.096* 0.082     
     (0.241) (0.098) (0.881)     
Cash flow growth     0.376 0.108 0.833     
     (0.532) (0.869) (0.132)     
UniqueFinAdvisor*Employment shock         0.734*** 0.890*** -0.088 
         (0.008) (0.003) (0.745) 
Employment shock         4.543** 3.347 10.890*** 
         (0.036) (0.149) (0.000) 
Employment growth         -4.727*** -4.097** -8.499*** 
         (0.002) (0.013) (0.000) 
Induscap -3.074*** -3.658*** -0.631  -3.617*** -3.834*** -0.339  -2.973*** -3.563*** -0.453 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.324)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.653)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.454) 
Return 2.719** 3.400** 2.959**  0.266 0.658 -0.074  3.090** 3.917*** 3.033** 
 (0.048) (0.019) (0.034)  (0.895) (0.754) (0.972)  (0.021) (0.006) (0.030) 
MB -0.512 -0.806 2.440***  0.637 0.710 3.680***  -0.389 -0.629 2.551*** 
 (0.482) (0.310) (0.002)  (0.478) (0.439) (0.001)  (0.583) (0.412) (0.002) 
SD 14.896 2.098 -33.820  19.048 12.180 -39.162  18.115 4.699 -35.068 
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 (0.519) (0.930) (0.203)  (0.468) (0.651) (0.207)  (0.433) (0.845) (0.193) 
DE -0.322 0.268 -1.482**  -0.400 -0.130 -1.128  -0.270 0.365 -1.234** 
 (0.582) (0.672) (0.016)  (0.688) (0.905) (0.317)  (0.656) (0.578) (0.048) 
Constant 9.660** 15.272*** -11.793**  11.452 12.454 -18.917***  7.879* 13.478*** -15.545*** 
 (0.027) (0.002) (0.016)  (0.118) (0.103) (0.003)  (0.080) (0.007) (0.001) 
            
N 1736 1736 1736  1174 1174 1174  1736 1736 1736 
R2 0.787 0.793 0.640  0.789 0.795 0.654  0.786 0.791 0.640 
adj. R2 0.786 0.792 0.638  0.787 0.794 0.651  0.785 0.790 0.638 





Table 11 OLS regressions of the interactions between financial advisors and specific industry shocks 
This table presents OLS regression estimates of the role of unique financial advisors and the interaction between financial advisors and specific industry shocks. 
UniqueFinAdvisor is the number of unique financial advisors computed as the sum of financial advisors participating M&A deals in a year minus the multiple times 
for each financial advisor in different M&A deals. UniqueFinAdvisor*Deregulation and UniqueFinAdvisor*RD are two interaction terms of UniqueFinAdvisor with 
deregulation and technology change, respectively. The control variables in deregulation are measured at year t, and the control variables in RD are measured at year t-
1. ***, **, and * represents statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, using a two-tail test. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. 
 Deregulation   Technology Change 
 Numdeals NumTdeals Deal value  Numdeals NumTdeals Deal value 
UniqueFinAdvisor 1.479*** 1.617*** 0.638**  2.995*** 3.200*** 2.084*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.043)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Deregulation      -2.516       -0.638 -14.941***     
 (0.263) (0.799) (0.007)     
UniqueFinAdvisor*Deregulation  0.534***  0.478***  1.645***     
 (0.001) (0.007) (0.000)     
UniqueFinAdvisor*RD     0.023 0.013 0.018 
     (0.270) (0.528) (0.649) 
RD     -1.390 -1.008 -0.218 
     (0.111) (0.257) (0.893) 
Induscap 0.366 -0.440 3.053  -3.253*** -3.854*** -0.891 
 (0.673) (0.646) (0.137)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.169) 
Return 5.169** 4.479 2.937  2.655** 3.518** 3.093** 
 (0.049) (0.103) (0.480)  (0.048) (0.014) (0.021) 
MB -0.847 -0.390 7.649**  0.485 0.235 2.017** 
 (0.546) (0.796) (0.047)  (0.461) (0.741) (0.011) 
SD 48.471 41.332 -54.790  25.201 9.854 -29.264 
 (0.273) (0.353) (0.464)  (0.270) (0.680) (0.267) 
DE -0.055 0.292 -2.493***  0.194 0.931 -1.173* 
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 (0.857) (0.420) (0.000)  (0.748) (0.157) (0.067) 
Constant -11.362 -2.148 -44.574**  9.519**  15.003*** -8.645* 
 (0.235) (0.837) (0.040)  (0.036) (0.003) (0.094) 
        
N 342 342 342  1736 1736 1736 
R2 0.783 0.764 0.518  0.782 0.786 0.640 
adj. R2 0.777 0.758 0.507  0.781 0.785 0.639 
F 162.686 142.408 34.265  102.249 101.603 76.253 
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Table 12 OLS regressions of the number of financial advisors with broad industry shocks 
The table reports OLS regressions of the number of financial advisors in M&A waves on measures of broad industry shocks. Three different measures of shock and growth 
(sales, cash flow and employment) are used. The explanatory and control variables are measured at year t-1, except for NumFinAdvisor. NumFinAdvisor is the financial 
advisors participation including multiple M&A deals for each financial advisor. Each regression uses 48 industries, each over 38 years (1980-2017). ***, **, and * represent 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, using a two-tail test. The numbers in parentheses are p-values.  
 Sales shock   Cash flow shock  Employment shock 
 Numdeals NumTdeals Deal value  Numdeals NumTdeals Deal value  Numdeals NumTdeals Deal value 
NumFinAdvisor 0.961*** 1.021*** 0.710***  0.961*** 1.005*** 0.717***  0.962*** 1.023*** 0.711*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales shock 5.324** 4.573* 6.084***         
 (0.027) (0.077) (0.001)         
Sales growth -0.804 1.254 -5.547***         
 (0.691) (0.558) (0.000)         
Cash flow shock     1.871*** 2.400*** 0.679*     
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.085)     
Cash flow growth     -1.112** -1.528*** -0.060     
     (0.019) (0.009) (0.890)     
Employee shock         0.986 0.001 5.824*** 
         (0.373) (0.999) (0.000) 
Employment growth         0.224 1.220 -5.199*** 
         (0.833) (0.303) (0.000) 
Induscap -1.568*** -1.954*** -0.074  -2.178*** -2.279*** 0.146  -1.694*** -2.140*** 0.062 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.891)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.815)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.900) 
Return 0.612 1.155 1.383  2.130 2.734 0.954  0.853 1.558 1.268 
 (0.602) (0.361) (0.251)  (0.244) (0.151) (0.603)  (0.456) (0.207) (0.284) 
MB -1.832*** -2.170*** 1.447**  -2.365** -2.393** 1.486  -1.821*** -2.144*** 1.459** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.036)  (0.015) (0.015) (0.109)  (0.004) (0.002) (0.038) 
SD -41.390** -59.792*** -69.017***  -52.796** -63.488*** -89.031***  -38.178* -56.462*** -68.455*** 
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 (0.039) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.023) (0.009) (0.002)  (0.053) (0.007) (0.006) 
DE -0.650 0.034 -2.043***  -1.358 -1.038 -2.151**  -0.565 0.150 -2.040*** 
 (0.225) (0.957) (0.001)  (0.121) (0.290) (0.045)  (0.292) (0.809) (0.001) 
Constant 17.805*** 22.517*** -0.854  27.627*** 28.757*** -1.968  19.898*** 25.691*** -3.032 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.872)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.755)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.521) 
            
N 1736 1736 1736  1174 1174 1174  1736 1736 1736 
R2 0.846 0.844 0.737  0.843 0.844 0.740  0.846 0.843 0.738 
adj. R2 0.845 0.843 0.736  0.842 0.843 0.739  0.845 0.843 0.736 




Table 13 OLS regressions of the number of financial advisors with specific industry shocks 
The table reports OLS regressions of the number of financial advisors in M&A waves on measures of specific industry shocks. Two different measures of 
shock (deregulation and technology change) are used. Deregulation is a dummy variable for 10 industries experiencing major federal deregulation: agriculture, 
banking, drugs, entertainment, healthcare, insurance, petroleum and natural gas, telecommunication, transportation and utility. Each industry covers the whole 
sample period (1980-2017). Technology change is measured by industry average research and development expense/sales ratio at year t-1. The regressions 
on technology change use 48 industries, each over 38 years (1980-2017). The variable, NumFinAdvisor, another measure of financial advisors, is the yearly 
number of financial advisors allowing each to handle multiple M&A deals. The control variables in deregulation are measured at year t, and the control 
variables in RD are measured at year t-1. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, using a two-tail test. The numbers 
in parentheses are p-values.  
 Deregulation  Technology Change 
 Numdeals NumTdeals Deal value  Numdeals NumTdeals Deal value 
NumFinAdvisor 0.636*** 0.667*** 0.765***  0.965*** 1.025*** 0.708*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Deregulation 5.067*** 5.967*** 10.004***     
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.005)     
RD     -0.417*** -0.408*** 0.532** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) 
Induscap 0.294 -0.573 1.571  -1.672*** -2.083*** -0.263 
 (0.565) (0.341) (0.488)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.612) 
Return 2.450 1.501 0.786  0.535 1.274 1.481 
 (0.129) (0.396) (0.848)  (0.635) (0.295) (0.196) 
MB -1.375* -0.880 5.375*  -1.251** -1.577*** 0.809 
 (0.087) (0.315) (0.065)  (0.024) (0.009) (0.214) 
SD 16.115 7.811 -96.614  -33.661* -52.716** -67.951*** 
 (0.548) (0.779) (0.158)  (0.084) (0.011) (0.005) 
DE -0.521*** -0.214 -3.299***  -0.593 0.124 -1.961*** 
 (0.010) (0.415) (0.000)  (0.268) (0.841) (0.001) 
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Constant -0.078 11.304* -29.987  18.951*** 24.291*** 1.984 
 (0.989) (0.089) (0.192)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.688) 
        
N 342 342 342  1736 1736 1736 
R2 0.908 0.892 0.622  0.847 0.844 0.740 
adj. R2 0.906 0.890 0.614  0.846 0.844 0.739 




Table 14 The occurrence of industry M&A waves measured by completed M&A deals and unique financial advisors 
 
The table reports the Probit models which estimate the relationship between financial advisors and the probability of the occurrence of an industry M&A wave. The 
dependent variable, wavedummy1, is a dummy variable which equals 1 when the maximum number of completed M&A deals occurs in an industry in an adjacent two-
year period within the periods of 1980-1989, 1990-1999, 2000-2009 and 2010-2017 respectively. All explanatory and control variables are measured at year t-1, except 
for UniqueFinAdvisor and the variables in column (4). UniqueFinAdvisor is the number of unique financial advisors, computed as the sum of financial advisors 
participating in M&A deals in a year minus the multiple times each financial advisor appears in different M&A deals. The explanatory and control variables in the 
column (4) are measured at year t. Each regression uses 48 industries, each over 38 years (1980-2017). ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively, by using a two-tailed test. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 wavedummy1 wavedummy1 wavedummy1 wavedummy1 wavedummy1 
UniqueFinAdvisor 0.011
*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.035*** 0.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales shock -0.184     
 (0.461)     
Sales growth 0.273     
 (0.222)     
Cashflow shock  -0.032    
  (0.116)    
Cashflow growth  -0.006    
  (0.749)    
Employment shock   -0.048   
   (0.737)   
Employment growth   0.108   
   (0.420)   
Deregulation    0.175  
    (0.442)  
RD     0.002 
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     (0.759) 
Induscap -0.044
** -0.040 -0.046** -0.189** -0.045** 
 (0.030) (0.132) (0.024) (0.021) (0.024) 
Return 0.000 0.197
* 0.015 0.151 0.018 
 (0.997) (0.077) (0.863) (0.500) (0.837) 
MB 0.198
*** 0.151*** 0.196*** 0.132 0.197*** 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.242) (0.000) 
SD -7.218
*** -7.773*** -7.302*** -8.252** -7.337*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.036) (0.000) 
DE -0.051
** -0.049* -0.050** -0.071* -0.049** 
 (0.024) (0.068) (0.025) (0.057) (0.030) 
Constant -0.329 -0.231 -0.282 0.774 -0.284 
 (0.167) (0.442) (0.229) (0.376) (0.218) 
N 1736 1174 1736 333 1736 
pseudo R2 0.047 0.051 0.046 0.086 0.045 





Table 15 The occurrence of industry M&A waves measured by the proportion of completed M&A deals and unique financial advisors 
 
The table reports the Probit models which estimate the relationship between financial advisors and the probability of the occurrence of an industry M&A wave. The 
dependent variable, wavedummy3, is a dummy variable which equals 1 when the maximum average proportion of completed M&A deals occurs in an adjacent two-
year period in an industry within 1980-1989, 1990-1999, 2000-2009 and 2010-2017 respectively. The proportion of completed M&A deals is computed as the number 
of completed M&A deals divided by the number of firms across time in an industry. All explanatory and control variables are measured at year t-1, except for 
UniqueFinAdvisor and the variables in column (4). UniqueFinAdvisor is the number of unique financial advisors, computed as the sum of financial advisors 
participating in M&A deals in a year minus the multiple times each financial advisor appears in different M&A deals. The explanatory and control variables in the 
column (4) are measured at year t. Each regression uses 48 industries, each over 38 years (1980-2017). ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively, by using a two-tailed test. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 wavedummy3 wavedummy3 wavedummy3 wavedummy3 wavedummy3 
UniqueFinAdvisor 0.014
*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.035*** 0.014*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales shock 0.444
*     
 (0.053)     
Sales growth -0.377
*     
 (0.052)     
Cashflow shock  -0.044**    
  (0.043)    
Cashflow growth  0.000    
  (0.992)    
Employment shock   0.269*   
   (0.062)   
Employment growth   -0.167   
   (0.215)   
Deregulation    0.196  
    (0.399)  
RD     -0.002 




* -0.053* -0.034 -0.173** -0.044** 
 (0.076) (0.059) (0.111) (0.035) (0.034) 
Return 0.152 0.393
*** 0.145 0.371* 0.134 
 (0.108) (0.001) (0.126) (0.098) (0.158) 
MB 0.129
*** 0.055 0.126*** 0.049 0.133*** 
 (0.002) (0.238) (0.003) (0.675) (0.002) 
SD -10.328
*** -10.665*** -10.266*** -11.236*** -9.838*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) 
DE -0.061
** -0.075*** -0.062** -0.075* -0.059** 
 (0.013) (0.007) (0.014) (0.069) (0.018) 
Constant -0.245 0.105 -0.315 0.791 -0.190 
 (0.316) (0.736) (0.192) (0.375) (0.418) 
N 1736 1174 1736 333 1736 
pseudo R2 0.063 0.075 0.063 0.101 0.060 





Table 16 The occurrence of industry M&A waves measured by the proportion of completed M&A transaction value and unique financial 
advisors 
 
The table reports the Probit models which estimate the relationship between financial advisors and the probability of the occurrence of an industry M&A wave. The 
dependent variable, wavedummy5, is a dummy variable which equals 1 when the maximum M&A transaction volume occurs in an industry in an adjacent two-year 
period within 1980-1989, 1990-1999, 2000-2009 and 2010-2017 respectively. All explanatory and control variables are measured at year t-1, except for 
UniqueFinAdvisor and the variables in column (4). UniqueFinAdvisor is the number of unique financial advisors, computed as the sum of financial advisors 
participating in M&A deals in a year minus the multiple times each financial advisor appears in different M&A deals. The explanatory and control variables in column 
(4) are measured at year t. Each regression uses 48 industries, each over 38 years (1980-2017). ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively, by using a two-tailed test. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 wavedummy5 wavedummy5 wavedummy5 wavedummy5 wavedummy5 
UniqueFinAdvisor 0.013
*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.031*** 0.013*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales shock 0.223     
 (0.299)     
Sales growth -0.102     
 (0.586)     
Cashflow shock  -0.035*    
  (0.056)    
Cashflow growth  -0.003    
  (0.842)    
Employment shock   -0.128   
   (0.379)   
Employment growth   0.220   
   (0.103)   
Deregulation    0.100  
    (0.640)  
RD     0.002 
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     (0.758) 
Induscap -0.037
* -0.068*** -0.046** -0.122 -0.043** 
 (0.067) (0.008) (0.020) (0.106) (0.029) 
Return 0.220
** 0.465*** 0.217** 0.451** 0.222** 
 (0.011) (0.000) (0.012) (0.029) (0.010) 
MB 0.241
*** 0.173*** 0.238*** 0.176* 0.241*** 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.095) (0.000) 
SD -9.109
*** -9.289*** -8.843*** -13.703*** -8.907*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DE -0.052
** -0.055** -0.051** -0.071** -0.049** 
 (0.015) (0.038) (0.014) (0.024) (0.020) 
Constant -0.165 0.395 -0.040 0.653 -0.081 
 (0.468) (0.178) (0.857) (0.425) (0.714) 
N 1736 1174 1736 333 1736 
pseudo R2 0.068 0.078 0.070 0.109 0.068 
chi2 103.062 91.375 106.145 40.417 102.636 
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Appendix Table 1 Description of Variables 
 
This table reports the description of all the variables used in this thesis. All variables are measured on year-
industry basis, except MarketFinAdvisor. MarketFinAdvisor only measures on yearly basis.  
Variable Description 
M&A waves Variables  
   Numdeals The number of M&A transactions completed 
   NumTdeals The number of M&A transactions announced 
   Deal value Transaction value in dollars ($billions) 
Financial Advisors Variables  
   UniqueFinAdvisor  The industry-year number of financial advisors participating 
in the M&A market without multiple appearing times  
   NumFinAdvisor The industry-year number of financial advisors participating 
in the M&A market including multiple appearances  
   MarketFinAdvisor The year number of financial advisors participating in the 
M&A market without multiple appearing times in all 
industries 
Shock Variables  
   Sales shock One measurement of broad industry shock by industry sales 
   Sales growth One measurement of broad industry shock by industry sales 
   Cash flow shock One measurement of broad industry shock by industry cash 
flow 
   Cash flow growth One measurement of broad industry shock by industry cash 
flow 
   Employee shock One measurement of broad industry shock by industry 
employment 
   Employment growth One measurement of broad industry shock by industry 
employment 
   Deregulation Dummy variable if a deregulation takes place 
   RD Industry average research and development expense over 
sales 
Control Variables  
   Induscap log of industry capitalization 
   MB Industry median market-to-book ratio 
   Return The median return in the industry for the three years ending 
at the end of t-1 
   SD Intra-industry standard deviation of 3 year return 
   DE Industry median debt to equity ratio 
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Appendix Table 2 Fama-Macbeth OLS regressions of unique financial advisors in M&A waves with broad industry shocks 
 
The table reports Fama-Macbeth regressions of the unique financial advisors in M&A waves on measures of broad industry shocks. Three different measures of broad 
industry shock and growth (sales, cash flow and employment) are used. All explanatory and control variables are measured at year t-1, except for UniqueFinAdvisor. 
UniqueFinAdvisor is the number of unique financial advisors, computed as the sum of financial advisors participating M&A deals in a year minus the multiple times for 
each financial advisor in different M&A deals. Each regression uses 48 industries, each over 38 years (1980-2017). ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 
5% and 10%, respectively, by using a two-tail test. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. 
 Sales shock  Cash Flow shock  Employment shock 
 Numdeals NumTdeals Deal 
value 
 Numdeals NumTdeals Deal 
value 
 Numdeals NumTdeals Deal 
value 
UniqueFinAdvisor 2.575*** 2.909*** 1.413***  2.628*** 2.739*** 1.576***  2.589*** 2.924*** 1.425*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales shock 12.414* 14.955* 6.970         
 (0.079) (0.054) (0.129)         
Sales growth 0.961 -0.770 -0.666         
 (0.877) (0.911) (0.833)         
Cash flow shock     8.159*** 9.069*** 3.781*     
     (0.003) (0.002) (0.071)     
Cash flow growth     -3.039 -3.781 -2.586     
     (0.198) (0.140) (0.184)     
Employee shock         14.496*** 15.141*** 10.822*** 
         (0.005) (0.004) (0.001) 
Employment growth         0.272 -0.533 -5.788*** 
         (0.935) (0.876) (0.001) 
Induscap -2.783*** -3.183*** 0.542  -2.590*** -2.536*** 1.221**  -2.608*** -3.015*** 0.622 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.151)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.019)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.120) 
Return -2.862 -2.470 -3.969*  0.849 0.805 -3.170  -1.399 -0.721 -2.271 
 (0.386) (0.474) (0.096)  (0.807) (0.822) (0.243)  (0.660) (0.829) (0.276) 
MB 2.028** 1.633* 4.351***  1.932* 1.948* 5.119***  1.762** 1.334 4.343*** 
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 (0.019) (0.082) (0.001)  (0.080) (0.092) (0.003)  (0.049) (0.169) (0.001) 
SD -5.394 5.505 -2.827  -0.306 -2.298 11.271  -19.320 -12.608 -16.278 
 (0.893) (0.899) (0.925)  (0.995) (0.965) (0.754)  (0.652) (0.783) (0.573) 
DE 0.350 0.644 0.646  -1.377* -1.267 1.107  0.190 0.519 0.644 
 (0.615) (0.388) (0.427)  (0.059) (0.102) (0.358)  (0.796) (0.508) (0.437) 
Constant 5.594 6.515 -25.133***  4.219 3.135 -34.503***  4.465 5.723 -26.214*** 
 (0.281) (0.228) (0.000)  (0.655) (0.746) (0.000)  (0.447) (0.342) (0.000) 
            
N 1736 1736 1736  1174 1174 1174  1736 1736 1736 
R2 0.864 0.848 0.762  0.884 0.886 0.802  0.864 0.847 0.762 
F 92.802 119.703 17.463  154.804 157.731 30.794  102.118 135.209 16.855 
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Appendix Table 3 OLS regressions of unique financial advisors in the log form of M&A waves with broad industry shocks 
 
The table reports OLS regressions of the unique financial advisors in M&A waves on measures of broad industry shocks. Three different measures of shock and growth (sales, 
cash flow and employment) are used. The explanatory and control variables are measured at year t-1, except for UniqueFinAdvisor. UniqueFinAdvisor is the number of unique 
financial advisors computed as the sum of financial advisors participating M&A deals in a year minus the multiple times for each financial advisor in different M&A deals. 
The three dependent variables are the log of value of Numdeals , NumTdeals and Deal value plus original number values. Each regression uses 48 industries, each over 38 
years (1980-2017). ***, **, and * represents statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, using a two-tail test. The numbers in parentheses are p-values.  




















*** 3.280*** 2.184***  3.160*** 3.307*** 2.268***  3.092*** 3.292*** 2.195*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales shock 12.569
*** 12.118*** 11.715***         
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
Sales growth -3.393 -1.298 -8.214
***         
 (0.18 (0.620) (0.000)         
Cash flow shock     1.118
* 1.601** 0.245     
     (0.059) (0.016) (0.616)     
Cash flow growth     0.012 -0.347 0.666     
     (0.984) (0.597) (0.249)     
Employee shock         7.363
*** 6.708*** 10.307*** 
         (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Employment growth         -4.087
*** -3.285** -8.433*** 
         (0.007) (0.042) (0.000) 
Induscap -2.972*** -3.546*** -0.398  -3.680*** -3.924*** -0.204  -3.057*** -3.694*** -0.244 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.552)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.788)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.689) 
Return 3.263** 3.939** 3.109**  2.038 2.573 0.774  3.778*** 4.662*** 3.123** 
 (0.028) (0.012) (0.041)  (0.348) (0.252) (0.728)  (0.009) (0.002) (0.037) 
MB -1.188 -1.513 2.629***  -0.071 0.037 3.887***  -1.153 -1.441 2.652*** 
 (0.168) (0.103) (0.005)  (0.947) (0.972) (0.004)  (0.161) (0.102) (0.006) 
SD -3.153 -19.430 -50.526*  6.004 -1.936 -53.231  0.118 -15.167 -49.223* 
 (0.896) (0.436) (0.072)  (0.828) (0.945) (0.105)  (0.996) (0.544) (0.082) 
DE -0.124 0.565 -1.402**  -0.145 0.224 -0.988  0.032 0.764 -1.359** 
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 (0.839) (0.395) (0.028)  (0.886) (0.839) (0.400)  (0.957) (0.247) (0.034) 
Constant 8.652* 13.861*** -14.817***  13.861* 15.137* -20.373***  10.373** 16.642*** -17.258*** 
 (0.074) (0.009) (0.009)  (0.071) (0.060) (0.003)  (0.027) (0.002) (0.001) 
            
N 1681 1691 1681  1151 1155 1151  1681 1691 1681 
R2 0.792 0.796 0.656  0.792 0.796 0.665  0.791 0.795 0.657 
adj. R2 0.791 0.795 0.654  0.790 0.795 0.663  0.790 0.794 0.656 
F 124.933 125.646 83.604  87.669 88.100 76.889  133.401 133.617 86.850 
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Appendix Table 4 Fama-Macbeth OLS regressions of unique financial advisors in M&A waves with specific industry shocks 
The table reports the Fama-Macbeth regressions of the unique financial advisors in M&A waves on measures of specific industry shocks. UniqueFinAdvisor is the 
number of unique financial advisors computed as the sum of financial advisors participating in M&A deals in a year minus the multiple times for each financial 
advisor in different M&A deals. Two different measures of shock (deregulation and technology change) are used. Deregulation is a dummy variable for 10 industries 
experiencing major federal deregulation: agriculture, banking, drugs, entertainment, healthcare, insurance, petroleum and natural gas, telecommunication, 
transportation and utility. Each industry covers all the sample period (1980-2017). Technology change is measured by industry average research and development 
expense/sales ratio at year t-1. The regressions on technology change use 48 industries, each over 38 years (1980-2017). ***, **, and * represent statistical significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, using a two-tail test. The numbers in parentheses are p-values.  
 Deregulation  Technology Change 
 Numdeals NumTdeals Deal value  Numdeals NumTdeals Deal value 
UniqueFinAdvisor 2.496*** 2.616*** 1.661**  2.584*** 2.919*** 1.413*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.010)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Deregulation 15.219 15.537 7.162     
 (0.120) (0.125) (0.561)     
RD     -4.495*** -4.614** -2.345 
     (0.004) (0.025) (0.350) 
Induscap 1.071 1.363 7.751*  -2.646*** -3.067*** 0.194 
 (0.700) (0.686) (0.084)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.636) 
Return -46.414 -43.897* 17.187  -0.400 0.317 -1.208 
 (0.111) (0.081) (0.585)  (0.904) (0.927) (0.453) 
MB 7.992 8.628 3.476  3.526*** 3.013*** 4.386*** 
 (0.345) (0.288) (0.725)  (0.001) (0.006) (0.007) 
SD -282.714 -359.208 -301.267  56.265 66.524 2.379 
 (0.269) (0.148) (0.361)  (0.169) (0.125) (0.929) 
DE -3.876** -4.071** -5.215**  0.482 0.809 0.810 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.030)  (0.488) (0.278) (0.331) 
Constant -22.642 -23.952 -123.686***  -0.371 1.060 -21.050*** 
 (0.412) (0.461) (0.005)  (0.941) (0.838) (0.000) 
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N 342 342 342  1736 1736 1736 
R2 0.960 0.957 0.944  0.861 0.844 0.769 
F 21.110 24.689 6.052  113.347 135.844 20.063 
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Appendix Table 5 OLS regressions of unique financial advisors in the log form of M&A waves with specific industry shocks 
 
The table reports the OLS regressions of the role of financial advisors in M&A waves on measures of specific industry shocks. UniqueFinAdvisor is the number of unique 
financial advisors is computed as the sum of financial advisors participating M&A deals in a year minus the multiple times for each financial advisor in different M&A deals. 
Two different measures of shock (deregulation and technology change) are used. Deregulation is a dummy variable for 10 industries experiencing major federal deregulation: 
agriculture, banking, drugs, entertainment, healthcare, insurance, petroleum and natural gas, telecommunication, transportation and utility. Each industry covers all the sample 
period (1980-2017). Technology change is measured by industry average research and development expense /sales ratio at year t-1. The regressions on technology change 
use 48 industries, each over 38 years (1980-2017). The three dependent variables are the log of value of Numdeals , NumTdeals and Deal value plus original number values. 
***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, using a two-tail test. The numbers in parentheses are p-values.  













UniqueFinAdvisor 2.001*** 2.085*** 2.162***  3.094*** 3.295*** 2.176*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Deregulation 6.561*** 7.333*** 12.666***     
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.004)     
RD     -0.434*** -0.427*** 0.536** 
     (0.001) (0.001) (0.019) 
Induscap 0.581 -0.266 3.924*  -3.287*** -3.905*** -0.713 
 (0.519) (0.786) (0.062)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.277) 
Return 5.828** 5.140* 4.502  3.347** 4.256*** 3.404** 
 (0.032) (0.070) (0.295)  (0.019) (0.005) (0.019) 
MB -1.295 -0.868 6.467*  -0.395 -0.686 1.852** 
 (0.360) (0.563) (0.096)  (0.608) (0.406) (0.039) 
SD 47.856 39.871 -60.949  11.078 -4.236 -45.040 
 (0.295) (0.385) (0.420)  (0.641) (0.864) (0.106) 
DE 0.005 0.347 -2.339***  0.068 0.805 -1.261* 
 (0.986) (0.332) (0.000)  (0.911) (0.222) (0.051) 
Constant -18.917** -7.893 -75.634***  12.420*** 18.416*** -9.841* 
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 (0.048) (0.439) (0.000)  (0.008) (0.000) (0.065) 
        
N 339 340 339  1681 1691 1681 
R2 0.780 0.762 0.513  0.791 0.795 0.658 
adj. R2 0.775 0.757 0.503  0.791 0.794 0.656 





Appendix Table 6 Pre- and post-change effects on financial advisors with specific industry shocks in OLS regressions  
 
This table reports OLS regressions of the pre- and post-change effects of the Financial Modernization Act of 1999 on industry M&A waves with specific industry 
shocks. The Financial Modernization Act was issued and implemented in 1999. The sample period (1980-2017) is divided in two: the pre-change period (1980-1998) 
and the post-change period (1999-2017). Columns (1), (3), (5) represent the regressions on the pre-change period, and columns (2), (4), (6) use the observations in the 
post-change period5. Panel A reports the regressions for deregulation. Panel B reports regressions for technology change. All explanatory and control variables are 
measured at year t-1, except for UniqueFinAdvisor. UniqueFinAdvisor is the number of unique financial advisors computed as the sum of financial advisors participating 
M&A deals in a year minus the multiple times for each financial advisor in different M&A deals. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively, using a two-tail test. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. 
       
Panel A: Deregulation      
 Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Numdeals Numdeals NumTdeals NumTdeals Deal value Deal value 
UniqueFinAdvisor 1.917
*** 2.028*** 2.009*** 2.158*** 1.901*** 2.405*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Deregulation 7.439
*** 3.467 8.785*** 3.616 9.308** 13.676 
 (0.000) (0.503 (0.000) (0.503) (0.018) (0.295) 
Induscap -0.629 3.101 -0.505 2.682 -0.469 7.474
* 
 (0.407) (0.144) (0.564) (0.227) (0.810) (0.075) 
Return 1.687 7.929
* 0.063 7.121 9.396 -4.200 
 (0.432) (0.094) (0.979) (0.139) (0.114) (0.533) 
MB 1.387 -4.185
* 1.116 -3.827 4.552 8.327 
 (0.319) (0.091) (0.477) (0.139) (0.230) (0.227) 
SD -93.536 68.420 -77.601 67.727 -230.584
* -154.098 
 (0.100) (0.218) (0.207) (0.228) (0.078) (0.108) 
DE 0.309 -1.179 0.645
* -1.247 -1.617*** -5.004*** 
                                                     
5 The difference of the effects of UniqueFinAdvisor between the pre- and post-change groups is tested by the Wald Test. In Panel A, the p-values of the test are: 0.6374 
(columns 1 and 2); 0.5713 (columns 3 and 4); 0.4556 (columns 5 and 6). In Panel B, the p-values of the Wald Test are: 0.0015 (columns 1 and 2); 0.0488 (columns 3 and 4); 
0.0001(columns 5 and 6).  
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 (0.289) (0.167) (0.074) (0.158) (0.001) (0.002) 
Constant -1.066 -48.997
*** -0.290 -44.830** -13.294 -120.241*** 
 (0.909 (0.008) (0.978) (0.020) (0.530) (0.000) 
       
N 171 171 171 171 171 171 
R2 0.885 0.654 0.873 0.648 0.496 0.434 
adj. R2 0.881 0.639 0.868 0.633 0.474 0.410 
F 98.021 47.790 77.991 46.654 5.402 18.996 
       
Panel B: Technology Change      
 Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Numdeals Numdeals NumTdeals NumTdeals Deal value Deal value 
UniqueFinAdvisor 2.398
*** 3.211*** 2.791*** 3.371*** 1.252*** 2.328*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RD -1.718
*** -0.476*** -1.935*** -0.472*** -1.061** 0.468** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.011) (0.045) 
Induscap -1.295
*** -4.541*** -1.755*** -4.889*** -0.240 -1.481 
 (0.005) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.412) (0.161) 
Return 1.432 2.222 1.943 2.672 2.429
* 2.527 
 (0.272) (0.346) (0.195) (0.278) (0.072) (0.256) 
MB 0.175 1.885
** -1.128 2.019** 1.422 3.738*** 
 (0.809) (0.038) (0.217) (0.033) (0.110) (0.003) 
SD 8.463 22.189 25.641 18.840 -25.945 -80.613
** 
 (0.741) (0.477) (0.428) (0.560) (0.283) (0.028) 
DE 0.997
** 0.566 1.437*** 0.945 0.094 -0.458 
 (0.017) (0.616) (0.005) (0.445) (0.823) (0.662) 
Constant -0.839 16.627 2.191 18.418
* -6.906** -5.700 
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 (0.838) (0.101) (0.651) (0.086) (0.018) (0.552) 
       
N 843 893 843 893 843 893 
R2 0.776 0.788 0.775 0.791 0.492 0.681 
adj. R2 0.774 0.786 0.773 0.789 0.488 0.678 





Appendix Table 7 The occurrence of industry M&A waves measured by announced M&A deals and unique financial advisors 
 
The table reports the Probit models which estimate the relationship between financial advisors and the probability of the occurrence of an industry M&A wave. The 
dependent variable, wavedummy2, is a dummy variable which equals 1 when the maximum number of announced M&A deals occurs in an industry in an adjacent 
two-year period within 1980-1989, 1990-1999, 2000-2009 and 2010-2017 respectively. All explanatory and control variables are measured at year t-1, except for 
UniqueFinAdvisor and the variables in column (4). UniqueFinAdvisor is the number of unique financial advisors, computed as the sum of financial advisors 
participating in M&A deals in a year minus the multiple times each financial advisor appears in different M&A deals. The explanatory and control variables in column 
(4) are measured at year t. Each regression uses 48 industries, each over 38 years (1980-2017). ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively, by using a two-tailed test. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 wavedummy2 wavedummy2 wavedummy2 wavedummy2 wavedummy2 
UniqueFinAdvisor 0.013
*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.035*** 0.013*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales shock -0.074     
 (0.770)     
Sales growth 0.247     
 (0.276)     
Cashflow shock  -0.035*    
  (0.083)    
Cashflow growth  -0.008    
  (0.652)    
Employment shock   -0.106   
   (0.498)   
Employment growth   0.227   
   (0.120)   
Deregulation    0.220  
    (0.351)  
RD     0.003 




** -0.048* -0.046** -0.191** -0.046** 
 (0.044) (0.070) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) 
Return -0.051 0.155 -0.036 0.043 -0.029 
 (0.572) (0.169) (0.685) (0.850) (0.744) 
MB 0.178
*** 0.107** 0.173*** 0.161 0.177*** 
 (0.000) (0.024) (0.000) (0.157) (0.000) 
SD -7.808
*** -9.096*** -7.791*** -9.419** -7.854*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.022) (0.000) 
DE -0.054
** -0.069** -0.053** -0.055 -0.050** 
 (0.022) (0.013) (0.024) (0.115) (0.034) 
Constant -0.348 0.027 -0.235 0.811 -0.241 
 (0.144) (0.928) (0.317) (0.369) (0.298) 
N 1736 1174 1736 333 1736 
pseudo R2 0.052 0.058 0.054 0.088 0.050 





Appendix Table 8 The occurrence of industry M&A waves measured by the fraction of announced M&A deals and unique financial advisors 
 
The table reports the Probit models which estimate the relationship between financial advisors and the probability of the occurrence of an industry M&A wave. The 
dependent variable, wavedummy4, is a dummy variable which equals 1 when the maximum fraction of M&A announcements occurs in an adjacent two-year period in 
an industry within 1980-1989, 1990-1999, 2000-2009 and 2010-2017 respectively. The fraction of M&A announcements is computed as the number of announced M&A 
bids divided by the number of firms in an industry. All explanatory and control variables are measured at year t-1, except for UniqueFinAdvisor and the variables in 
column (4). UniqueFinAdvisor is the number of unique financial advisors, computed as the sum of financial advisors participating in M&A deals in a year minus the 
multiple times each financial advisor appears in different M&A deals. The explanatory and control variables in column (4) are measured at year t. Each regression uses 
48 industries, each over 38 years (1980-2017). ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, by using a two-tailed test. The numbers 
in parentheses are p-values. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 wavedummy4 wavedummy4 wavedummy4 wavedummy4 wavedummy4 
UniqueFinAdvisor 0.014
*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.030*** 0.014*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales shock 0.391
*     
 (0.082)     
Sales growth -0.357
*     
 (0.062)     
Cashflow shock  -0.064***    
  (0.002)    
Cashflow growth  0.020    
  (0.288)    
Employment shock   0.232   
   (0.100)   
Employment growth   -0.160   
   (0.225)   
Deregulation    0.188  
    (0.417)  
RD     -0.002 




** -0.069** -0.039* -0.172** -0.048** 
 (0.041) (0.016) (0.061) (0.035) (0.020) 
Return 0.177
* 0.387*** 0.168* 0.241 0.159* 
 (0.061) (0.002) (0.077) (0.316) (0.093) 
MB 0.127
*** 0.063 0.125*** 0.088 0.130*** 
 (0.002) (0.172) (0.003) (0.439) (0.002) 
SD -9.684
*** -10.524*** -9.612*** -12.599*** -9.264*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DE -0.061
** -0.072*** -0.063** -0.066* -0.060** 
 (0.014) (0.009) (0.014) (0.097) (0.017) 
Constant -0.224 0.223 -0.297 0.945 -0.190 
 (0.355) (0.481) (0.214) (0.292) (0.412) 
N 1736 1174 1736 333 1736 
pseudo R2 0.059 0.078 0.058 0.083 0.056 
chi2 81.966 72.928 80.975 28.037 77.467 
 
